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Listen to Cass County Music: The Right to
Jury Trials in Copyright Infringement Actions
When Statutory Damages Are Elected
Megan E. Ward*
I Introduction
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution grants liti-
gants the right to a jury trial in civil actions by providing that "[i]n suits at
common law.., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."' The United
States Supreme Court explained that the phrase "suits at common law" refers
not only to causes of action that common law created and recognized as legal
in 1791,2 but also to "statutory rights, ... if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law."3
Thus, the Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial applies to a statutory right
creating a legal, as opposed to an equitable, cause of action
Although the rule that the Seventh Amendment applies to legal causes of
action may appear to be clear, its application proves more complex than
* I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Doug Rendleman for suggesting
this topic and assisting in the development of this Note. I would also like to thank my family
for supporting my every endeavor.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (explaining that it is settled law that
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial extends beyond legal actions existing in 1791).
3. Id. at 194. In Curtis, the Supreme Court stated that:
common law ... meant ... not merely suits, which the common law recognized
among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined.... In ajust sense, the amendment then may well be
construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
whatever might be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.
Id. at 193 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)). Therefore, the Court
reasoned that the Seventh Amendment is applicable to new causes of action based on congres-
siona enactments if the rights and remedies created can be characterized as legal. Id. at 193-94.
4. See William Patry, The Right to a Jury in Copyright Cases, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
139, 144 (1981) (explaining that right to jury trial under Seventh Amendment is limited to
assertion of legal rights).
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simply determining whether a case is an "action at law" or a "suit in equity."
The 1938 merger of law and equity in the federal courts made the classifica-
tion of some issues as legal or equitable difficult because it allowed litigants
to bring both legal and equitable claims in one action.' Because parties may
now join both legal and equitable claims in one suit, the Supreme Court has
explained that the right to ajury trial under the Seventh Amendment "depends
on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall
action."6 The Supreme Court proposed a three-prong test to determine if an
issue is of a "legal" nature: "first, the pre-merger custom with reference to
such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities
and limitations ofjuries."7 Thus, the Court created a test that requires an in-
depth, three-step analysis of each statutorily created right.'
Statutory damages elected pursuant to the federal copyright statute9 -
granting the award based on the limits set by the statute and not by the actual
damages demonstrated- exemplifies a statutorily created right. 10 To ascertain
whether a copyright infringement suit requesting statutory damages requires
ajury trial, the court must determine: (1) whether Congress granted the right
to a jury trial in such cases" or (2) whether the provision is "legal" in nature
and would therefore fall within the Seventh Amendment guarantee. 2
5. See David Phippen, Case Comment, Fourth CircuitReview: RighttoJury Trial Under
Copyright Act's Statutory Damage Provision, 39 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 800, 800 n.1 (1982)
(noting that merger of law and equity has complicated issue of whether Seventh Amendment
applies to statutory right). Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]
party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable,
or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party." FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a); see also Patiy,
supra note 4, at 144 (explaining differences in federal courts before and after 1938 merger).
6. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
7. Id. at 538 n.10 (citing Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in CivilActions, 72
YALE L.J. 655 (1963)).
8. See infra Part IMI.A (discussing development of test and its current application in-
volving meaning of each prong).
9. Copyright Act of 1976 § 504(c)(1), 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1994).
10. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 663 (1834) (stating that right of
copyright protection "does not exist at common law; it originated, if at all, under the acts of
congress").
11. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (recognizing "'cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the (constitutional) question may be avoided"' (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971))).
12. See Andrew W. Stumpff, Note, The Availability ofJury Trials in Copyright Infringe-
ment Cases: Limiting the Scope of the Seventh Amendment, 83 MICH. L. Rv. 1950, 1951
(1985) (arguing that statutory damages provision escapes clear classification as either legal or
equitable).
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Although some courts that have addressed the question have based their
decisions solely on the language of the copyright statute itself,13 most courts
have found the statutory language ambiguous and therefore have focused on
the constitutional issue and analysis. 4 The complexity of the right to jury trial
issue, 5 the inherent difficulties of the Supreme Court's test, 6 and the failure
of some courts to analyze fully the problem 7 have prevented federal courts of
appeals from reaching a consensus on the constitutional issue. Consequently,
the circuits are divided five-to-three, with the majority finding no right to a
jury trial in copyright infringement actions when the plaintiff elects statutory
damages. 8
13. See Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The determination of
statutory damages... is assigned by statute to the judge rather than the jury."); Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977)
(explaining that denial of rightto jury trial is based on 1909 statute's authorization for court to
use its discretion in assessing statutory damages).
14. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 641-44 (8th Cir. 1996)
(applying Ross v. Bernhard test after finding that statute does not resolve question); Video
Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 852 (1 th Cir. 1990) (following
Fifth Circuit by stating that "no constitutional or statutory right to ajury trial" exists); Gnossos
Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that statute's language is
ambiguous and applying constitutional analysis); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 645
F.2d 6, 7 (5th Cir. May 1981) (stating that entire case is equitable under Ross and therefore no
constitutional or statutory right to jury trial exists).
15. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (discussing different formulations of
constitutional test).
16. See infra Part III.B (discussing application of test to copyright cases).
17. See infra notes 205-11, 246-48 and accompanying text (summarizing criticism of
circuit court decisions).
18. See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 852
(11 th Cir. 1990) (following Fifth Circuit by stating that "no constitutional or statutory right to
ajury trial" exists); Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that statute
assigns determination of statutory damages to judge); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith,
645 F.2d 6,7 (5th Cir. May 1981) (finding no constitutional or statutory right to jury trial); Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir.)
(explaining that judge, not jury, should properly address "in lieu" damages); Chappell & Co.
v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1957) (finding that because statutory damages
provision invoked equity jurisdiction, no right to jury trial existed); see also Columbia Pictures
Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 292-93 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding no statutory or constitutional rightto jury trial under 1976 Act), cert. grantedsub non.
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 118 S. Ct. 30(1997). Butsee Cass County Music Co.
v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 644 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that either party to copyright
infringement suit involving statutory damages is entitled to jury trial); Video Views, Inc. v.
Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that factual questions of
infringement and willfulness should be submitted to jury, but judge should decide appropriate
award ofstatutory damages); Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 1981)
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Recently, however, support for the minority view is increasing. In Cass
County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R, Inc.,9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles either party the
right to ajury trial in a copyright infringement action involving a request for
statutory damages." In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit provided the
most well-reasoned, thorough analysis of any circuit that has addressed this
issue.2 Cass County Music demonstrates the existence of a Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial in copyright infringement suits when the plaintiff
seeks statutory damages.'
This Note addresses whether a right to a jury trial exists in copyright
infringement cases when the plaintiffelects statutory damages. Part II surveys
(holding that Seventh Amendment mandates trial by jury in copyright infringement action for
statutory damages).
19. 88 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1996).
20. Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 644 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
that "either party in a copyright infringement suit is entitled under the Seventh Amendment to
ajury trial on demand"). In Cass County Music, the court considered whether the district court
erred in refusing to allow the defendants' request for ajury trial in a copyright infringement suit
demanding statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Id. at 636-37. The court stated that
it must consider whether the statute compels or the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial
when plaintiff seeks statutory damages. Id. at 638. The court found that, because of the diverse
reasoning and conclusions of the other circuits, it must analyze the question itself. Id. at 639-
40. The court determined that the statutory language and legislative history of 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c) did not conclusively answer the question of whether Congress intended to provide for
jury trials. Id. at 640-41. Turning to constitutional analysis, the Cass County court stated that
the Seventh Amendment requires ajury trial for suits "in which legal rights are sought to be
adjudicated and legal remedies are imposed, as compared with those suits where the rights and
the remedies are equitable." Id at 641 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,
41 (1989)). In order to determine whether a statutory right is legal or equitable, the court
considered analogous eighteenth century actions brought before the merger of law and equity
and determined that copyright infringement is a legal action. Id at 641-42. Specifically, the
court relied on the Supreme Court's recent holding that patent infringement actions must be
tried to ajury. Id at 641 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389
(1996)). Because copyright and patent infringement actions are derived from the same constitu-
tional provision and require "functionally" the same elements to prove liability, the court
reasoned that copyright and patent infringement actions are sufficiently analogous. Id. at 641-
42. Moreover, the court determined that the remedy of statutory damages is legal in nature. Id.
at 643. Specifically, the court stated that statutory damages have the "attributes" of a legal
remedy because, although they have always had restitutional qualities, more recently they have
been characterized as punitive damages, which are traditionally a jury matter. Id. Conse-
quently, the Cass County Music court held that either party had a right to a jury trial in a
copyright infringement case when statutory damages are requested. Id. at 644.
21. See infra notes 276-89 and accompanying text (arguing that Cass County Music deci-
sion contains best reasoned analysis).
22. See infra notes 276-88 and accompanying text (supporting conclusion that Cass
County Music decision is correct).
1688
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIALS
the history of copyright statutes in the United States and examines the
statutory damages provisions' of the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act)24 and
the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act).' Part III examines the Supreme
Court's test for determining whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury
trial, applies the test to the Copyright Act's statutory damages section, and
discusses some of the difficulties that have arisen in its application.2 6 Part IV
explores the majority and minority views on the issue by studying the courts
of appeals' opinions and examining their strengths and weaknessesY Part V
analyzes the Eighth Circuit's Cass County Music opinion and concludes that
the court's decision was correct.2 Part V also argues that the court's well-
reasoned analysis provides an excellent model for the Supreme Court to
follow when it ultimately decides the issue of the right to a jury trial in
copyright infringement statutory damages suits in the spring of 1998.29
II. Historical Analysis and Statutory Construction of the Copyright Acts
In addressing the question of whether the right to a jury trial applies
to a given statute, courts first look to the statutory language and its legis-
lative history to determine if Congress provided for the right."0 Courts pro-
ceed to the constitutional question only if the congressional intent is ambigu-
23. See infra notes 30-57 and accompanying text (concluding that statutory construc-
tion and historical analysis of copyright statutes does not clearly determine whether Congress
intended to create right to jury trial).
24. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
25. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
26. See infra notes 59-127 and accompanying text (explaining constitutional tests and
discussing criticisms of and difficulties in applying them).
27. See infra notes 128-248 and accompanying text (discussing and criticizing circuit
court decisions).
28. See infra notes 249-89 and accompanying text (analyzing Cass County Music deci-
sion).
29. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Feltner v. Colum-
bia Pictures Television and will determine whether either § 504(c) permits or requires, or the
Seventh Amendment guarantees, the right to ajury trial in copyright infringement actions for
statutory damages. See Feltuer v. Columbia Pictures Television, 118 S. Ct. 30 (1997) (granting
certiorari); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 66 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1997)
(presenting questions for review); see also infra notes 196-204 and accompanying text
(discussing Ninth Circuit's decision of Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of
Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Feltnerv. Columbia Pictures
Television, 118 S. Ct. 30 (1997)).
30. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (noting "cardinal principle" of
Supreme Court review is to begin with examination of statute to determine whether it answers
question).
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ous.3 A study of the statutory language requires: (1) a historical analysis of
the evolution of copyright statutes to determine if any continuous congressio-
nal intent was transmitted to the present statute and (2) an examination of the
actual language of the current statute. 2 First, commentators have reached
different conclusions as to whether the right to a jury trial existed in earlier
enactments and was transmitted to the present statute, leaving historical
analysis of past copyright statutes indeterminate. One commentator, William
Patry, traces the history of copyright statutes33 and determines that the 1909
Act's statutory damages provision34 incorporates the right to a jury trial
because that section adopted the terms of prior statutes which either provided
or implied the right to a jury trial.35 Specifically, Patry argues that Section
25(b)(4) is substantively identical to the 1856 amendments of a previous
copyright statute.36 The Supreme Court's recognition of a right to ajury in an
adjudication under the 1856 amendments, 37 along with the legislative history
of Section 25(b)(4) of the 1909 Act which states that it substantially reenacts
existing law,38 leads Patry to reason that subsection (4) implies the right to a
jury trial.39 He then argues that the right must exist for the entire statutory
damages provision because the legislative history does not indicate that courts
should treat subsection (4) differently from the rest of Section 25(b). 0 Patry
31. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,369 (1971) (explaining
that statutory construction analyzed first and constitutional question addressed only if needed).
32. See Patry, supra note 4, at 175, 193-94 (arguing that right to jury trials exists in 1909
and 1976 copyright acts because Congress incorporated language from previous acts, such as
Supplementary Act of 1856, in which right to jury was implied).
33. See id. at 145-73 (analyzing copyright acts in seventeenth and eighteenth century
England and in United States from 1783 through 1897).
34. Copyright Act of 1909 § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101(b)
(1970)), repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541. Section 25(b) contained the first
statutory, "in lieu," damages provision in a copyright act. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1959
(explaining that statutory damages for copyright infringement did not exist prior to 1909).
35. See Patry, supra note 4, at 175, 193-94 (arguing that right to jury trials exists in 1909
and 1976 Copyright Acts' statutory damages provisions because when 1909 Act created right
to statutory damages it incorporated intact language of previous statutes which provided for
right to jury trial).
36. See id. at 175 (highlighting that House Report on 1909 Act states that only modifica-
tion from 1856 amendment was "fixing the damages for an infringing performance of a purely
musical composition at $10").
37. See id. (referring to Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 160-61 (1899)).
38. See id. (stating that House Report indicates that 1909 Act is "substantial reenactment
of existing law").
39. See id. ("Not one word is uttered in the House Report to suggest a change in that
right.").
40. See id. ("[I]t would be ludicrous to assume that the right [to a jury trial] existed for
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concludes that the consistent language used in the 1909 Act and prior statutes
evidences in part the right to a jury trial in copyright infringement actions
when the plaintiff elects statutory damages.4'
At leastone othercommentator disagrees with Patry's reasoning. Andrew
W. Stumpff reasons that, although all of the copyright acts prior to 1909
included damage provisions, the 1909 Act was the first to present the plaintiff
with the option of choosing "statutory damages" in lieu of actual damages.42
Stumpff argues that Patry's use of a string of essentially unchanged statutes
to demonstrate a statutory right to a jury trial under the 1909 Act ignores the
fact that the statutory damages created by the 1909 Act differed substantially
from those of earlier statutes.43 Under this reasoning, Patry's argument is
irrelevant." These differing interpretations indicate that a historical analysis
of the evolution of copyright statutes may not dispositively answer the ques-
tion of whether Congress created a right to a jury trial for statutory damages
in copyright infringement actions.
Second, the language of the 1909 and 1976 statutes does not con-
clusively reveal Congress's intent regarding the right to a jury trial. Al-
though the statutory damages provisions of the copyright acts of 19094' and
only [subdivision (4)]. Such a tortured arrangement should be found to exist only with the
clearest expression of Congressional intent.").
41. See id. at 194 (concluding that 1909 Act did not alter right to jury trial found in prior
enactments and that present statute "does not change this either").
42. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1958-59 (arguing that minimum and maximum damage
award provisions in earlier statutes "applied to actual, provable damages, not to a wholly dis-
cretionary amount set by the court" and citing statutes to demonstrate that none provided for "in
lieu" damages); see also Raydiola Music v. Revelation Rob, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 369, 370 & n.2
(D. Del. 1990) (noting disagreement between Patry and Stumpff and finding no right to jury
trial when plaintiff seeks statutory damages); Education Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 670 F.
Supp. 1237, 1238 & n.5 (D.N.J. 1987) (noting conflict between Stumpff and Patry).
43. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1959 n.74 (explaining that Patry ignores fact that "in
lieu" damages provided in 1909 Act removed determination of amount received from proof of
factual loss which is substantially different from earlier statutes providing minimum and
maximum range for damages).
44. See id. at 1959 (concluding that pre-1909 history of copyright statutes is of little
relevance).
45. Section 25(b) provided, in pertinent part:
That if any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the
copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable: ... [t]o pay to the
copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered
due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have
made from such infringement... or in lieu of actual damages and profits such
damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the
court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated ....
Copyright Act of 1909 § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970)),
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197646 differ in organization and detail,47 the language each act employs
regarding the determination of damages contains two similarities. First, both
statutes direct the "court" to award damages as it considers "just."4 Some
courts have relied on this language to determine that a judge, sitting without
a jury, properly hears statutory damages claims.49 However, commentators
have debated the significance of the word "court" in these statutes and
generally have determined this language to be indecisive." Second, courts
repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541.
46. Section 504(c) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may
elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages ... in a sum of not less than
$500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just...
(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion
may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000.
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds,
that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts
constituted an infringement ofcopyright, the court i[n] its discretion may reduce the
award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994). The original 1976 Act was identical to the current version except
that the damage awards were exactly one-half of the present amounts. See Copyright Act of
1976 § 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994)).
47. Compare § 25(b), 35 Stat at 1081 with 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)-(c). The two acts differ
in organization in that the 1909 Act provided for actual damages, profits, and statutory damages
in one section while the 1976 Act provides for actual damages and profits in Section 504(b).
See supra notes 45-46 (quoting Section 25(b) of the 1909 Act and Section 504(c) of the 1976
Act). Also, the 1909 Act furnished substantially more detail regarding the amount of statutory
damages that courts might award for various types of copyrighted materials while the 1976 Act
creates a monetary range applicable for all types of copyright infringements. Id.
48. See supra notes 45-46 (quoting statutory language).
49. See Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211,213 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that "determination
of statutory damages... is assigned by statute to the judge rather than the jury"); Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977)
(stating that "the issue of 'in lieu' damages is properly addressed to the court, not the jury").
But see Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 129 (4th Cir. 1981) ("If anything, the
language of section 504(c) enforces rather than detracts from an interpretation requiring ajury
trial"); Mail & Express Co. v. Life Publ'g Co., 192 F. 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1912) (finding that
statutory language did not preclude jury trial). In Mail & Express Co., the Second Circuit ex-
plained:
While the language of the provision quoted is somewhat obscure, we do not think
that by the use of the word "court" it is required that the judge acting by himself
shall assess the damages .... We think it the better view that the statute permits
him to direct the jury to assess the damages within the prescribed limits.
Id.
50. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NMM&E. & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
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and commentators have debated the relevance of the use of the word "discre-
tion" in reference to the "court" in both statutes.5' At least one court and one
commentator have found this language persuasive because the use of
discretion traditionally belonged to the judge and did not include the jury. 2
However, other commentators have argued that the 1976 Act's use of the
word "discretion" refers to the court's authority to raise or lower the damage
award only upon a finding of willfulness or innocence- a factual determina-
tion usually left to the jury. 3 Thus, they also have concluded that this
language is not dispositive of congressional intent regarding the right to ajury
trial. 4 Therefore, the continuing conflict over the plain meaning of the
statutory damages provision does not resolve whether Congress intended to
provide for the right to a jury trial.
Because the statutory language does not clearly demonstrate Congress's
intent regarding the right to ajury trial, one next must examine the legislative
history to see whether it supplies the answer.55 Unfortunately, the legislative
history does little more than utilize the same confusing terms as the statute
itself, without providing definitions for the words or a purpose for their use.56
§ 14.04[C] (1997) (recognizing that "court" does not necessarily mean judge withoutjury, but
stating that it is "perhaps the better view"); Patty, supra note 4, at 163 (pointing out that "as to
the court ... shall appear to be just" language was first used in 1856 copyright statute and that
Supreme Court recognized right to jury trial for claims arising under this statute); Ted J.
Feldman, Note, An Examination ofthe Right to Jury Trial Where Copyright Statutory Damages
are Elected, 21 HoFsTRA L. RV. 261, 264-69 (1992) (discussing statutory language and
concluding it is not dispositive of congressional intent); Nancy J. Niemeier, Comment, The
Right to Trial by Jury in Copyright Infringement Suits Seeking Statutory Damages, 17 S. ILL.
U. L.L 135, 137, 139-40 (1992) (arguing that use of"court" in Section 504(c) of the 1976 Act
leaves determination of right to jury trial unanswered, but suggesting that absence of word
"court" in actual damages provision of 1976 Act may indicate congressional intent to treat
statutory damages differently).
51. See supra notes 45-46 (quoting statutory language).
52. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 302, 305 (N.D.
Ind. 1979) (finding "discretion" language suggests that judge rather than jury decides statutory
damages issues); Niemeier, supra note 50, at 140 (explaining that use of"court" and "discre-
tion" provides argument that statute does not provide right to jury trial as judges traditionally
exercise discretion).
53. See Patry, supra note 4, at 190-91 (arguing that use of word "discretion" does not
detract fromjury determination of willfulness or innocence); Feldman, supra note 50, at 267-68
(arguing that jury decides key issues and judge sets damage amount within statutory range).
54. See Feldman, supra note 50, at 262 (arguing language is not dispositive); Niemeier,
supra note 50, at 139-40 (same).
55. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that examination of statute
includes studying its language and legislative history).
56. See H.R.REP.No. 94-1476, at 161-62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5777-78 ("As a general rule, where the plaintiff elects to recover statutory damages, the court
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Thus, it appears that the legislative history of the 1976 Act does not disposi-
tively answer whether Congress intended to create a right to a trial by jury for
cases arising under the statutory damages provision. 7 As a result, a constitu-
tional analysis is necessary to determine whether the Seventh Amendment
guarantees such a right. 8
I. Constitutional Analysis of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial in Copyright Statutory Damages Actions
A. The Constitutional Test(s)
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to ajury trial in federal civil
"[s]uits at common law."59 As noted, determining whetherthe Seventh Amend-
ment applies to a given cause of action can be complicated because the merger
of law and equity actions in federal courts can make it difficult to ascertain
whether a cause of action is legal, and therefore a "sui[t] at common law," or
equitable, and therefore beyond the scope of the Amendment." In Ross v.
Bernhard," the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Seventh
Amendment requires ajury trial in shareholder derivative suits and provided
a test for determining whether the Amendment governs a particular cause of
action. 2 In Ross, the Court explained that "the nature of the issue to be tried
is obliged to award between $250 and $10,000. It can exercise discretion in awarding an
amount within that range.. .. " (emphasis added)).
57. See Wendy K. Breuninger, Statutory Damages and Right to Jury Trial in Copyright
Infringement Suits, 24 IDEA 249, 250 (1984) (reviewing House and Senate reports and con-
cluding that Congress provided no clear guidance as to its intent regarding this issue).
58. See United Statesv. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,369 (1971) (explaining
that statutory construction analyzed first and constitutional question addressed only if needed).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reiter-
ates this right by stating that "[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate." FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
60. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing application of Seventh
Amendment as limited to "legal" actions and explaining difficulties created by merger of federal
courts of law and equity under FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a)).
61. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
62. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532-33, 538 n. 10 (1970) (holding that right to jury
trial attaches to issues in derivative actions which would have entitled corporation suing in its
own right to jury trial). In Ross, the Supreme Court considered whether the Seventh Amend-
ment applies to stockholders' derivative actions. Id. at 531. The Court noted that it has
construed the Amendment to apply to "suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and
determined." Id. at 533 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)). How-
ever, the Court recognized the difficulty that may sometimes arise in drawing the line between
legal and equitable actions. Id. (citing Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891)).
Specifically, a shareholder's action contains two matters: (1) the plaintiffs right to sue on
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rather than the character of the overall action" must be legal for the jury trial
right to exist. 3 The Court provided three criteria that courts should consider
in determining whether an issue is "legal" in nature: (1) the premerger cus-
tom, (2) the nature of the remedy sought, and (3) the practical limitations of
juries.' Although the Ross Court examined both the history and the remedy
associated with derivative suits, it did not explicitly apply this three-prong
test."5 As a result, the decision provides no guidance for determining how to
utilize this test.
In Tull v. United States,66 the Supreme Court explained and refined the
three-prong Ross test. 7 The Court explained that the first prong requires a
behalf of the corporation (which was historically recognized as a derivative suit brought in
equity); and (2) the merits of the corporation claim (which, if it had been a legal claim brought
by the corporation itself, would have been recognized by the common law at the time the
Seventh Amendment was adopted). Id. at 535, 538. Although derivative suits could deal with
both equitable and legal issues, a court of equity had to determine the question of the
shareholder's right to bring a claim on behalf of the corporation Id. at 535. Therefore, before
the merger of law and equity in the federal courts, the prevailing opinion was to hear the entire
derivative suit, including legal claims, in equity because no remedy at law existed for the
stockholder. Id. at 537, 539. However, the Court recognized that due to the merger of law and
equity in federal practice, the right to ajury trial for legal claims could not be infringed because
the action also contained equitable questions. Id. at 538. Instead, the Court declared that the
focus of the Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial is the "nature of the issue to be tried rather
than the character of the overall action." Id. Following this rule, the Court determined that
"[tihe heart of the [derivative] action is the corporate claim." Id. at 539. The Court reasoned
that if the corporate claim presents a legal issue for which the Seventh Amendment would
entitle the corporation to a jury trial, this right is not lost merely because the court must first
adjudicate the equitable issue of the stockholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation. Id.
Specifically, in determining that the underlying claims were legal in nature, the Court looked
to the history of corporate claims and found that the common law recognized such claims
brought by the corporation itself. Id. at 533-34. The Court also noted that the shareholders
sought money damages. Id. at 542. Finally, the Court established that equity courts heard
stockholder derivative suits due to standing in courts of law that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure altered without affecting the legal nature of the underlying claim. Id. at 537-39. As
a result, the Court decided that the right to ajury trial exists for those claims in a stockholder's
derivative action that historically were considered legal if the corporation itself would have
brought them. Id. at 542.
63. Id. at 538.
64. See id. at 538 n.10 (setting out three factors for courts to consider in determining
"legal" nature of issue) (citing James, supra note 7, at 655). It is important to note that the
Court listed these criteria in a footnote of the opinion as factors which it had considered in
previous cases to determine the "legal" nature of an issue. See infra notes 73-92 and accom-
panying text (summarizing criticisms of Ross test).
65. See Ross, 396 U.S. at 533-37, 542 (analyzing history of derivative suits and implying
legal nature of money damages).
66. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
67. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18, 427 (1987) (concluding that Seventh
1695
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1685 (1997)
comparison of "the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.""8 Next,
the Court stated that for the second prong of the analysis, "we examine the
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature."69
Furthermore, the Court called this second prong the "more important" of the
two parts of the historical analysis." Finally, the Court noted that the third
prong addressed the applicability of the Seventh Amendment in administrative
proceedings and that courts should not use it as an independent basis for
finding a right to ajury trial.7' Thus, after Tull, the Ross test consists of: (1) a
determination of whether the issue or its closest historical analogy was
considered "legal" when the Seventh Amendment was ratified in 1791; (2) a
classification of the nature of the remedy as either legal or equitable; and, if
the nature of the issue and the remedy are found to be historically "legal,"
(3) a decision of whether the proceeding has been entrusted to an administra-
Amendment guarantees right to jury trial for determination of liability but not for assessment
of damages for cases brought under Clean Water Act). In Tull, the Supreme Court considered
whether the Seventh Amendment applies to cases brought under the Clean Water Act. Id. at
414. The Court stated that the proper test is first, to examine the nature of the action by compar-
ing the statutory action to eighteenth century actions in England, and second, to determine the
nature of the remedy. Id. at 417-18. The Court found that the nature of the action was
indeterminate. Id. at 420. Specifically, the Court analogized this civil penalty action to both
the eighteenth century action in debt, a legal action, and the public nuisance action, an equity
action. Id. However, the Court applied the second part of the test to conclude that the nature
of the remedy was legal. Id. at 421, 423. That is, the Court recognized that this case involved
a civil penalty that was designed for punishment and not determined by equitable considerations
such as profit Id. at 422-23. Such remedies were traditionally enforced in courts of law only.
Id. However, the Court determined that the assessment of civil penalties by the jury was not
constitutionally protected. Id. at 426 n.9. Consequently, the Court decided that the Seventh
Amendment required a jury trial in this case on the issue of liability but not on the issue of
damages. Id. at 427.
68. Id. at 417.
69. Id. at417-18.
70. See id. at421 (statingview "thatcharacterizingthereliefsoughtis'[m]ore important'
than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action in determining whether the
Seventh Amendment guarantees ajury trial" (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196
(1974))).
71. See id. at 418 n.4 (discussing third prong ofRoss test). In addressing the scope of the
third prong, the Court stated that it
has also considered the practical limitations of ajury trial and its functional com-
patibility with proceedings outside of traditional courts of law in holding that the
Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings. Butthe Court
has not used these considerations as an independent basis for extending the right
to ajury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
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tive agency and thus falls outside of the Seventh Amendment. 72
In subsequent cases questioning the right to a jury trial on a particular
issue, the Supreme Court has largely followed the basic formulation devel-
oped in Ross and explained in Tull.73 However, both judges and commenta-
tors have criticized and challenged the Ross-Tull test on two grounds. First,
commentators argue that the Ross test misinterprets the preservation language
of the Seventh Amendment.' In asserting this argument, these commentators
have reached different conclusions about the true meaning of the Seventh
Amendment. Professor John C. McCoid, II argues that the preservation lan-
guage of the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to ajury trial on issues
that courts recognized as legal in 17 91 .7L However, he believes that the Ross
Court did not intend footnote 10 to propose a constitutional test that separates
remedy analysis from history, but simply to reflect an understanding of the
difficulties involved in applying the historical test.76 Accordingto this analysis,
the Ross test places undue weight on the nature of the remedy, and instead, the
72. See id. at 417-18 (discussing interpretation and analysis of Seventh Amendment's
"[s]uits at common law" language).
73. See, e.g., Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93,
97 (1991) (quoting Tull Court's formulation of analysis of applicability of Seventh Amendment
to given issue); Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (same); Gran-
financiera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 40-42 (1989) (same). In each of these cases the
Court also reiterated the fact that the second inquiry regarding the nature of the remedy was the
more important in the analysis. See Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 97 (stating that second prong is most
important part of analysis); Terry, 494 U.S. at 565 (same); Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42
(same).
In Granfinanciera, the Court also noted that, if the first two factors indicate that the
Seventh Amendment entitles the party to ajury trial, the third prong is used to "decide whether
Congress may assign and has assigned resolution of the relevant claim to a non-Article III
adjudicative body that does not use ajury as factfinder." Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42; see
also Terry, 494 U.S. at 565 n.4 (explaining that third prong is not independent basis for finding
right to jury trial, but is used to determine "whether Congress has permissibly entrusted the
resolution of certain disputes to an administrative agency or specialized court of equity, and
whether jury trials would impair the functioning of the legislative scheme." (quoting
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4)); supra note 71 (quoting Tull Court explanation of third
prong). Additionally, the Court noted that the Seventh Amendment applies only to "private
rights." Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4.
74. The Seventh Amendment declares that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
75. See John C. McCoid, II, Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 15, 19 (1991) (proposing that preservation language refers to
actions tried at law in eighteenth century England).
76. See id. at 19 n.26 (discussing purpose of footnote in Ross that sets out three-prong
test); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n. 10 (1970) (stating that premerger custom
prong "requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most
difficult to apply").
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correct test should be a "comprehensive, but single, historical inquiry."77 Mc-
Coid explains that the three-prong test only works when the central question
focuses on the effect of the merger of law and equity, as it did in the deriva-
tive suit issue in Ross." Otherwise, the test bifurcates the historical analysis
and causes courts to place too much weight on the nature of the remedy.79
Alternatively, McCoid proposes that the proper question should be whether
eighteenth century English courts would have tried the matter in equity or at
law and, in some cases, whether process changes justify a different result to-
day." McCoid explains that the law and equity jurisdictions in eighteenth
century England differed in substance, remedy, and procedure."1 Therefore,
the remedy question is also an aspect of the premerger custom.82 McCoid
argues that the Ross test adds weight to the nature of the remedy, "obscur[ing]
the significance of subject matter and procedure in the historical separation
of law and equity," and therefore the test fails to apply the Seventh Amend-
ment correctly. 3
In contrast, one commentator argues that the preservation language of the
Seventh Amendment does not guarantee ajury trial at all, but merely provides
for the possibility of ajury in civil matters by authorizing Congress to pass laws
that require jury trials for certain cases." This commentator argues that the
77. McCoid, supra note 75, at 19.
78. See id. (criticizing use of Ross test and suggesting that test is effective only in cases
when effect of merger is at issue).
79. See id. (criticizing Ross test and suggesting that single historical analysis is correct
Seventh Amendment test).
80. See id. (arguing that preservation language of Seventh Amendment advocates single
historical test).
81. See id. at 20 (discussing substantive, remedial, and procedural difference in law and
equity in eighteenth century). But see Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 578
(1990) (Brennan, J. concurring) (arguing for pure nature of remedy test and stating that "histor-
ically, '[i]urisdictional lines [between law and equity] were primarily a matter of remedy"'
(quoting John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of
Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1967))).
82. See McCoid, supra note 75, at 20 (describing how Ross test gives nature of remedy
added weight).
83. See id. at 20, 28 (concluding that Ross test is inappropriate under preservation lan-
guage of Seventh Amendment). The Supreme Court's own statement that the remedy prong of
the test is more important than the premerger custom prong demonstrates the weight placed on
the remedy analysis. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (stating that
remedy is most important element of test); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987)
(same). This statement by the Court demonstrates that the Ross test may apply inaccurately the
Seventh Amendment guarantee if McCoid is correct in his assertion.
84. See Rachael E. Schwartz, "Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines": An
Alternative Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SEroN HALL CONST. L.J. 599, 603
(1996) (arguing alternative interpretation of Seventh Amendment preservation language).
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framers proposedthe SeventhAmendmentto counter anti-Federalist arguments
that the Constitution abolished civil jury trials because Article III provided for
jury trials in criminal cases only." Thus, the commentator claims that the
Ross test engages in incorrect historical analysis and that the Seventh Amend-
ment guarantees a right to ajury trial only when Congress authorizes it.
6
Second, certain Supreme Courtjustices have challenged the first prong's
"historical analysis" as both unworkable and irrelevant. Justice Brennan con-
siders the historical analysis unmanageable for three main reasons. First, the
Ross test itself acknowledges the difficulties involved in performing the his-
torical comparison. 7 Second, because the line between law and equity is not
fixed, the determination of the nature of the issue can rest on differing inter-
pretations.88 Third, modem statutory rights often make drawing the historical
analogy difficult.8 9 Additionally, Justices Stewart and Brennan have deemed
the historical analysis irrelevant because classification of the nature of the
issue depends on how one presents it and because the Supreme Court has
stressed the greater importance of the remedy prong in the constitutional
analysis.9' Thus, Justices and commentators still debate the adequacy of the
Ross test.92 Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court has neither explicitly
overturned nor inconsistently modified the Ross "historical analysis" test, as
elaborated in Tull, courts must always apply it when determining whether the
Seventh Amendment provides for a jury trial on a given issue.
85. See id. at 605-06 (discussing Anti-Federalist arguments concerning jury trials).
86. See id. at 603-04 (arguing that alternative interpretation provides for more coherent
application of Seventh Amendment).
87. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (stating that historical analysis
prong "is obviously the most difficult to apply"); see also Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry,
494 U.S. 558, 576 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (claiming it is better to leave comparisons
between today's causes of action and past ones to legal historians).
88. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 576 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that "'the line between
law and equity (and therefore between jury and non-jury trial) was not a fixed and static one.
There was a continual process of borrowing by one jurisdiction from the other.... This led to
a very large overlap between law and equity" (quoting James, supra note 7, at 658-59)).
89. See id. at 577 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing difficulties in matching modem
statutory rights to historical issues).
90. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 550 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (attacking
majority's nature of issue approach by arguing that issues are neither inherently legal nor equi-
table, but are colored by surrounding circumstances and by way they are presented).
91. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring) (claiming that historical test has
little purpose as court has explained that remedy prong is more important).
92. See id. at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that courts use only nature of
remedy to perform constitutional analysis of right to jury trial). But see id. at 593 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (arguing for historical test because it supports Seventh Amendment's preservation
language); McCoid, supra note 75, at 19 (arguing that Ross test is incorrect in light of Seventh
Amendment's preservation language and that purely historical test is required).
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B. Application of Constitutional Test to Copyright Infringement Actions
When Plaintiff Demands Statutory Damages
Courts and commentators addressing the question of whether a constitu-
tional right to a jury trial exists in a copyright infringement action when the
plaintiff requests statutory damages have applied the Ross-Tull test with dif-
fering results. They disagree on the conclusion of the historical analysis,93 the
nature of the statutory damages remedy,94 and the purpose and outcome of the
"ability of juries" question.95 Therefore, a review of the major arguments
presented by each side for each prong of the test is useful in analyzing the
Eighth Circuit's opinion and reasoning in Cass County Music.
The first prong of the Ross test requires a historical analysis of the legal
or equitable nature of the issue (or an analogous issue) in the courts of
England and the United States in 1791.96 When applying this prong to the
statutory damages copyright infringement action, proponents of the right to a
jury trial have provided two reasons for determining that the nature of the
issue is legal. First, commentators have relied on a survey of the history of
copyright laws in England and the United States conducted by William Patry
in which Patry argues that the current statutory damages provision essentially
replicates the copyright cause of action existing in 1791 that litigants brought
in courts of law.9" Patry traces copyright statutes from English law in 1710
to the United States's present statute to demonstrate a continuous line of legal
actions under statutory damages provisions.98 Therefore, he argues that the
historical test demonstrates the legal nature of the issue.
93. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text (discussing proponents' and oppo-
nents' historical prong analysis conclusions).
94. See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text (providing arguments over legal or
equitable nature of statutory damages).
95. See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of "ability of
juries" prong and commentators views regarding its persuasiveness in determining whether
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial exists).
96. See supra notes 64, 68 and accompanying text (explaining first prong of Ross test).
97. See Patry, supra note 4, at 139-94 (tracing history of copyright statutes from eight-
eenth century England and United States through 1976 Act); see also Feldman, supra note 50,
at 271-75 (incorporating Patry's research into analysis of first prong to demonstrate legal nature
of issue); Niemeier, supra note 50, at 142 n.46 (explaining Patry's conclusion that copyright
actions for both statutory and actual damages historically have been legal).
98. See Patry, supra note 4, at 145-94 (tracing history of copyright acts in United States
and concluding that 1976 Act is derived from past copyright acts that were recognized as legal
actions). Patry begins with the Statute of Anne of 1710 that provided for damages based on the
number of copies and that courts of law hear the cases. Id. at 146. Next, Patry illustrates that
seven state statutes enacted between 1783 and 1785 (before federal copyright law) provided for
actions at law or actions of debt, and of them, two states provided for minimum and maximum
damages levels. Id. at 150-5 1. He also demonstrates that the first federal copyright act, enacted
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Second, the Fourth Circuit relied on an analogy to the action for tortious
interference with a property right, recognized as legal in 1791, to conclude
that the first prong of the Ross test favors the right to a jury trial.99 One com-
mentator defends this analogy as appropriate because "both [actions] protect
a right of ownership."'" Thus, the historical test worked both directly and
analogously to label the issue legal.
Nevertheless, opponents of the right to a jury trial dispute both lines of
historical analysis. First, Stumpff dismisses Patry's attempt to connect the
1976 Act's statutory damages provision to copyright acts existing in 1791.
Stumpff argues that, unlike the present statute and the 1909 Act's "in lieu"
damages, any statutorily set minimum and maximum damage measure in
previous enactments "applied to actual, provable damages, not to a wholly
discretionary amount set by the court."'0° Because § 504(a) of the present
statute does not correlate damages with factual loss, Stumpff argues that the
nature of pre-1791 statutes is irrelevant to the inquiry under the first prong of
the Ross test.'0° Second, he disputes the significance of the analogy drawn to
tortious interference with a property right.0 3 Instead, Stumpff contends that
tort actions involving property can be either legal or equitable!' 4 Therefore,
opponents find the proponents' arguments unpersuasive and, as a result, find
the historical analysis prong of the test inconclusive. 5
The second prong of the test focuses on the nature of the remedy. 6
Proponents of the right to ajury trial offer three justifications for designating
the remedy as legal. First, they argue that the monetary nature of the damage
award makes the remedy quintessentially legal.0 7 Second, proponents argue
in 1790 (before ratification of Seventh Amendment), provided forjurisdiction in the legal courts
only. Id. at 156. Furthermore, Patry notes that equity jurisdiction for copyright actions was
permitted in 1856 but that the legal jurisdiction was never repealed. Id. at 163-64. Finally, he
argues that the 1909 act's "in lieu" damages provision was identical in concept to previous
statutes dating back to the 1783 state statutes, which were legal actions, and that the 1976 Act
also contained the same concept. Id. at 190. Therefore, Patry reasons that the historical analysis
demonstrates that copyright infringement statutory damages actions are legal in nature. Iad at 194.
99. See Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that
copyright infringement is tortious interference with property right).
100. Phippen, supra note 5, at 806.
101. Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1959.
102. See id. at 1959 n.74 (explaining Patry's argument).
103. See id. at 1960 (finding analogy "unhelpful").
104. See id (noting that copyright actions are example of problem with tort analogy
because plaintiff can seek relief of injunction in equity or of damages at law).
105. See id. (concluding that "pre-merger history of copyright damages is inconclusive").
106. See supra notes 64,69 and accompanying text (explaining second prong ofRoss test).
107. See Niemeier, supra note 50, at 147 (stating that monetary remedy "smacks ofthe law
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that statutory damages are either compensatory or punitive, both of which are
traditionally legal types of remedies.108 They explain that statutory damages
are similarto actual damages, with aminimum amount ofrecoveryprovided. 0 9
Thus, Congress did not develop the statutory damages provision to change the
substantive rights of parties in a copyright infringement suit, but created it
only to substitute a surrogate damages measure for actual damages when
uncertainty precludes proof of the latter.11° Furthermore, proponents argue
that statutory damages are punitive in nature because, although the present
provision eliminated criminal sanctions, § 504(c)(2) still evidences a punitive
intent by providing increased liability for willful infringement."' Third, one
court has found the statutory damages provision analogous to an action for
debt, a traditional legal remedy." 2 As the Supreme Court explained, an action
for debt involves "a sum which can readily be reduced to a certainty.""' Al-
though statutory damages are, by definition, not an exact sum, proponents
argue the persuasiveness of this analogy lies in the fact that the statute in
question also prescribed limits for the damage award." 4 Thus, proponents of
the right to a jury trial have proposed several reasons for finding that the
remedy involved is legal.
Opponents of the right to a jury trial argue that statutory damages are
equitable for two reasons. First, the discretion provided in the statute supports
a conclusion that the action is equitable in nature because "[t]he exercise of
discretion in setting damages within prescribed limits is a hallmark of
equity.""' 5 Second, the statutory damages remedy is restitutionary instead of
side of the court... [because] money damages are the quintessential form of legal relief granted
by ajury" (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 670
F. Supp. 1237, 1242 (D.N.J. 1987))); see also Feldman, supra note 50, at 277 (referring to
Katzman); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1642,
1645 (1992) (reviewing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE
(1991)) (explaining that Seventh Amendment preservation of right to jury trial in legal actions
includes actions for money damages).
108. See Phippen, supra note 5, at 807 (explaining that compensatory damages are legal
remedies).
109. See id. (discussing legal nature of statutory damages remedy).
110. Id.
111. See Niemeier, supra note 50, at 148 (discussing punitive nature of statutory damages).
112. See Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that
remedy is legal).
113. Feldman, supra note 50, at 278 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Stockwell v.
United States, 80 U.S. 531, 542 (1871)).
114. See id. (discussing criticism of analogy based on fact that copyright statutory damages
are not "sum certain," but are discretionary).
115. Niemeier, supra note 50, at 144 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Raydiola
Music v. Revelation Rob, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 369, 376 (D. Del. 1990); see also Stumpff, supra
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punitive or compensatory because it is based on fairness within set statutory
limits rather than actual injury. 16 Furthermore, even if statutory damages
have a punitive element, ajudge may determine punitive remedies. 1 7 Stumpff
contends that the proponents' argument that § 504(c)(2) demonstrates the
punitive nature of statutory damages is logically flawed because, even if sub-
section (c)(2) has punitive qualities, subsection (c)(1) awards damages with-
out considering any of the punitive quality elements of subsection (c)(2)."'
The third prong of the test requires an examination of the complexity of
the issue and the jury's ability to understand it."9 The rationale behind this
note 12, at 1962 (arguing that, although statutory damages are monetary, degree of discretion
provided in § 504(c) suggests that statutory damages are not legal).
116. See Niemeier, supra note 50, at 145 (describing statutory damages as equitable); of
United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1491, 1497 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (stating that
CERCLA cost recovery action is restitution and, because restitution is equitable, no right to jury
trial exists; assuming restitution is equitable without explanation or analysis). But see I DAN
B. DOBBS, LAWOF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RETETrION 556 (2d ed. 1993) (explain-
ing that restitution may be either legal or equitable); Rendleman, supra note 107, at 1644
("Restitution wears both legal and equitable garb."). Dobbs explains that restitution claims for
money damages are usually legal, while restitution claims requiring some "equitable" judicial
action, such as "coercive intervention," are equitable. I DOBBS, supra, at 556; see also Rendle-
man, supra note 107, at 1644-45 (explaining that legal remedies include money judgments and
provide forjury factfinding). Thus, simply because damages are not based on actual injury does
not mean that they are equitable. Instead, the monetary damage range the statute provides may
merely be a legislative estimate of the average plaintiff's damages predetermined for admin-
istrative convenience to save the plaintiff from having to prove actual damages at trial.
Furthermore, courts traditionally granted equitable remedies only when legal remedies
were inadequate. 1 DOBBS, supra, at 58. As a result, if commentators argue that statutory
damages are equitable, they must first demonstrate that the legal remedies would have been
inadequate (instead ofjust less convenient or more burdensome for the plaintiff to prove). They
cannot simply declare that the restitutionary character of statutory damages makes these
damages equitable because restitution may be either legal or equitable. Thus, the argument that
statutory damages are restitution and therefore equitable assumes the conclusion that the type
of restitution copyright statutory damages grants is equitable, as opposed to legal, without
providing the proper support.
117. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1956 n.55 (citing cases in which punitive remedies
were within judge's domain).
118. See id. at 1956 (discussing subsections (c)(1)-(2)).
119. See supra notes 64, 71 and accompanying text (discussing third prong of test as
explained in Ross and Tul). The purpose of the third prong is unclear. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text (explaining Ross test in which Supreme Court noted that courts should
consider practical limitations of juries to understand complex issues in determining whether
Seventh Amendment entitles parties to jury trial for specific issue); see also Niemeier, supra
note 50, at 149 n.95 (explaining that Supreme Court apparently created "complexity exception"
with third prong but noting that Ninth Circuit has refused to acknowledge such exception to
Seventh Amendmentbecause itwould be impossibleto draw meaningful linebetween cases that
are and are not too complex forjury). But see Niemeier, supra note 50, at 150 n.100 (noting
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prong is that if the issues and facts are too complicated for the jury to under-
stand, the judge is in a better position to guarantee fairness to the parties by
trying the case himself.12° Courts and commentators, however, have found
this prong inconclusive in determining whether a constitutional right to ajury
trial exists for copyright infringement actions when the plaintiff seeks statu-
tory damages.121 Both courts and commentators have decided that copyright
infringement issues are not prohibitively complex."2 Commentators explain
that complexity issue can only take away right to jury trial, but cannot grant it); Stumpff, supra
note 12, at 1965 (explaining that third prong works only to limit right to jury trial; court may
find no right to jury trial if case is too complex, but ifjuy can manage issues then issues are
also within "grasp" of judge and test is inconclusive); supra note 71 and accompanying text
(quoting Tull Court that Supreme Court has not used third prong as independent basis for
finding Seventh Amendment right to jury trial). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has implied
that the third prong is relevant only when a dispute exists regarding whether a non-Article III
tribunal should properly hear the issue in question. See Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990) (finding that third prong did not affect analysis of whether Seventh
Amendment provided right to jury trial in action for breach of duty of fair representation
because no party disputed that Article III court may properly hear such actions). In Terry, the
Supreme Court explained that the "[third] consideration is relevant only to the determination
'whether Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain disputes to an
administrative agency or specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials would impair the
functioning of the legislative scheme."' Id (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v.Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33, 42 n.4 (1989)); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987) (noting that
Supreme Court has used third prong to hold that Seventh Amendment does not apply to
administrative proceedings). However, because the Supreme Court has not stated that courts
should no longer use the "abilities ofjuries" consideration in analyzing a Seventh Amendment
applicability question, and because other courts and commentators have provided analyses of
this prong in addressing the Seventh Amendment issue, this Note would not be complete
without a discussion of the third prong as it applies to the Copyright Act's statutory damages
provision. See Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 670 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (D.N.J. 1987)
(applying third prong in constitutional analysis); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, 201
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 302,305 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (same); Feldman, supra note 50, at282 (discussing
practical limitations and abilities of juries in copyright statutory damages cases); Niemeier,
supra note 50, at 149-51 (same); Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1964-65 (same).
120. See Feldman, supra note 50, at 282 (explaining rationale for consideration of ability
ofjuries in Seventh Amendment analysis).
121. See Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 670 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (D.N.J. 1987)
(finding that third prong is inconclusive); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, 201 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 302, 305 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (same); Feldman, supra note 50, at 282 (same); Stumpff,
supra note 12, at 1965 (same).
122. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996)
(noting that issues of liability and damage assessment are within jury's ability in ordinary copy-
right case); Katzman, 670 F. Supp. at 1243 (declaring that copyright infringement issues are no
more complex than other issues juries decide); Papa John's, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 305
(stating that, in instant case, issues are not too complicated for jury); Feldman, supra note 50,
at 282 (arguing that infringement and damages issues in copyright cases are not prohibitively
complex); Niemeier, supra note 50, at 150 (noting that although copyright suits involve
complex issues,juries decide more complicated issues including hearing securities and antitrust
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that juries make factual determinations on infringement issues in cases when
the plaintiff seeks actual damages." Therefore, one cannot argue that such
issues are too complex for juries in statutory damages cases without also
affecting the characterization of actual damages cases.'24 However, finding
that an issue is not prohibitively complex does not necessarily make it legal
in nature." Because the complexity prong works only to exclude overly
complicated issues, itis not helpful in determining whether noncomplex issues
are legal or equitable.'26 Thus, the third prong is inconclusive in the context
of statutory copyright damages.127
IV Courts ofAppeals Disagree on the Right to a Jury Trial
A. The Majority View
The federal courts of appeals in five circuits have decided that the parties
in a copyright infringement action involving a statutory damages claim have
no right to ajury trial.' Two courts have based this decision solely on the
cases and inflicting death penalties and concluding that, in comparison, determining damages
within statutory limits does not seem prohibitively complex); Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1964-
65 (admitting that copyright infringement issues are generally not prohibitively complex). But
see Niemeier, supra note 50, at 150 (suggesting that statutory damages determination may be
too complicated for juries because, unlike actual damages cases, when copyright owner elects
statutory damages, parties do not offer proof of injury and profits that decision-maker can use
as guidance to set damage award).
123. See Feldman, supra note 50, at 268 (noting that juries properly decide critical in-
fringement issues in copyright cases involving actual damages); Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1965
(stating that courts have always considered suits for actual damages legal).
124. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1965 (arguing that one cannot use third prong to
determine that statutory damages are equitable without also deciding that actual damages are
equitable).
125. See Feldman, supra note 50, at 282 (explaining that third prong is unclear as to
whether issues within competence of bothjudge and jury are legal or equitable); Stumpff, supra
note 12, at 1965 (explaining that third prong works only to limit right to jury trial - if issue is
too complex for jury, third prong requires that issue is equitable, but if issue is within compe-
tence ofjury, third prong does not affirmatively make issue legal).
126. See Feldman, supra note 50, at 282 (explaining that third prong is unclear as to
whether issues within competence of bothjudge and jury are legal or equitable); Stumpff, supra
note 12, at 1965 (same).
127. See Feldman, supra note 50, at 282 (arguing that third prong of Ross test is incon-
clusive); Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1965 (same).
128. See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 852
(11 th Cir. 1990) (following Fifth Circuit by stating that "no constitutional or statutory right to
ajury trial" exists); Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that statute
assigns determination of statutory damages to judge); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith,
645 F.2d 6,7 (5th Cir. May 1981) (finding no constitutional or statutory right to jury trial); Sid
& Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir.
1977) (explaining thatjudge, not jury, properly addressed "in lieu" damages); Chappell & Co.
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statutory language of either the 1909 Act or the 1976 Act.129 In Sid & Marty
Krofft Products Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp.,30 the Ninth Circuit
held that, under the 1909 Act, once the plaintiffs have had an opportunity to
prove actual profits, both the decision to award "in lieu" damages and the
amount of such a damages award is within the court's discretion. 3 1 Because
the Act directed the court to use its discretion in determining whether statutory
damages should be awarded "in lieu" of actual damages and profits, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the decision to award statutory damages belongs to the
judge and not the jury.Y3 2 Thus, the court based its decision that the parties
were not entitled to ajury determination of the statutory damages issue solely
on an interpretation of the plain language of the 1909 Act.
133
Two criticisms of the Krofft decision are (1) that the court's statutory
language analysis is not applicable to the 1976 Act14 and (2) that the case is
v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1957) (finding that because statutory damages
provision invoked equityjurisdiction, no right to jury trial existed); see also Columbia Pictures
Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284,292-93 (9th Cir.) (finding no
statutory or constitutional right to jury trial), cert. granted sub nom. Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, 118 S. Ct. 30 (1997).
129. See Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983) (declaring that 1976 Act
assigns determination of all statutory damages, including increased penalties for willful infringe-
ment, to judge and not to jury); Sid & Marty Kroff Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that 1909 Act provides thatjudge determines statutory
damages).
130. 562F.2d 1157(9thCir. 1977).
131. Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th
Cir. 1977) (holding that, under 1909 Act, once plaintiffs have had opportunity to prove actual
profits, court should determine propriety of awarding "in lieu" damages in instant situation and
that statutory damages award is within court's discretion). In Krojff, the court considered
whether the district court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion to hear testimony on the
issue of the applicability of statutory, "in lieu," damages after the dismissal of thejury. Id. The
Kroffl court reversed the district court on the basis that "in lieu" damages are within the judge's
domain and thus not properly addressed to the jury. Id. The Kroffl court reasoned that
Section 101(b) expressly stated that the court should use its discretion to award statutory
damages within the prescribed limits. Id. Furthermore, the statute directed the court, not the
jury, to use its judgment to determine a "just" measure of damages in a given case. Id. (quoting
L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 106 (1919)). Thus, the Kroffl
court found that the language of Section 10 l(b) placed the decision to award statutory damages
in a given case in the judge's discretion. Id.
132. See id. (finding that statutory language calls for judicial discretion in determining
whether given situation warrants statutory damages award).
133. See id. at 1177 n.5 (quoting Section 101 and relying on statute's "discretion" and
"just" language to find thatjury plays no role in determining whether statutory damages should
be awarded "in lieu" of actual damages).
134. See Feldman, supra note 50, at 261-62 & n.6 (noting differences in statutory language
of 1909 and 1976 Acts); Niemeier, supra note 50, at 136 (noting that decisions based solely on
statutory language are complicated because of differences in 1909 and 1976 Acts).
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not authoritative because it failed to provide a constitutional analysis of the
issue.'35 First, because the language and meaning of 1976 Act differ from the
1909 Act, the Krofft court's decision does not apply to the 1976 Act. The
Kroffi court based its decision that the statute did not provide for the right to a
jury trial on the explicit use of the word "discretion" in Section 101(b) of the
1909 Act. 36 However, Section 504(c)(1) does not contain any reference to the
court's discretion. 37 Furthermore, Section 101(b) gave the court the power to
use its discretion to determine whether the facts of the case required an award
of statutory damages instead of actual damages and profits, but Section 504(c)
clearly states that the copyright owner may elect statutory damages instead of
actual damages. 3 Thus, because the 1976 Act no longer places the decision
to seek statutory damages in the court's discretion, the reasons for the Krofft
court's finding that the judge must decide issues of statutory damages are
inapplicable to the 1976 Act.
139
Second, although the Kroffi court determined that the statute did not
provide for ajury trial, the court failed to address whether the Seventh Amend-
ment guarantees this right. 4 Regardless of whether a statute does or does not
135. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 14.6 (2d. ed. 1996) (noting that early cases are
not dispositive because they failed to consider constitutional question of whether statutory
damages are legal or equitable); Patry, supra note 4, at 188 (criticizing Kroffl decision for its
"sparse analysis" and questioning whether it even addressed constitutional issue).
136. See Kroffl, 562F.2d at 1177 (decidingthat 1909 Act's explicit direction ofcourt'suse
ofdiscretion to determine propriety of"in lieu" damages in individual case takes issue from jury).
137. See Phippen, supra note 5, at 805 (distinguishing Kroffl from Gnossos on basis that
Kroffl court decided that 1909 Act's "discretion" language required "court" to use equitable
powers so therefore judge decides statutory damages issue but explaining that 1976 Act does
notcontain same "discretion" language); supra note 46 (quoting Section 504(c)(1) of 1976 Act).
But see Feldman, supra note 50, at 261 n.6 (noting that § 504(c)(2) does refer to court's discre-
tion but explaining that reference pertains to court's authority to increase or decrease statutory
limits based on finding of willfulness or innocence).
138. Compare F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231-32
(1952) (explaining that Section 101(b) gives court discretion to choose between computed
(actual) damages and imputed (statutory) damages based on situation presented in individual
case) with supra note 46 (quoting Section 504(c) of 1976 Act: "the copyright owner may elect,
at any time before judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an
award of statutory damages").
139. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (explaining Kroffl court's justification for
finding that judge must decide statutory damages issues because statute directs judge to use dis-
cretion to choose between actual and "in lieu" damages). But see Columbia Pictures Television
v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 293 (9th Cir.) (finding Kroffl rationale
applicable to Section 504 because both statutes provide for damages "as the court considers
just," but not addressing differences in statutes regarding who elects statutory damages or how
"discretion" language relied on in Krofft may apply to 1976 Act), cert. grantedsub nom. Feltner
v. Columbia Pictures Television, 118 S. Ct. 30 (1997).
140. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1953 n.24 (arguing that because Kroffl was purely stat-
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grant a jury trial, the Supreme Court has stated that the Seventh Amendment
requires a jury trial on demand for statutorily created legal rights and rem-
edies.141 Congress cannot take away a constitutional right by statutory enact-
ment.142 Therefore, the Krofflcourt's analysis is faulty and incomplete because
it decided the jury trial issue solely on the language of the statute, without
addressing the legal or equitable nature of the action. The Krofft court denied
the constitutional right to ajury trial based not on constitutional analysis but on
congressional intent as evidenced by statutory language.'43
In Oboler v. Goldin," the Second Circuit found that the 1976 Act assigns
the determination of statutory damages to the judge.'45 In dicta, the court
presented the different remedies for infringement under the 1976 Act. 46 With-
out any explanation, the court declared that Section 504(c) assigns the deter-
mination of statutory damages to the judge.'47 Therefore, the court expressed
its opinion that the statutory language of the 1976 Act precluded ajury trial for
the statutory damages issue.148
utory decision, court implicitly held that Seventh Amendment has no application to statutory
damages).
141. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (applying Seventh Amendment to
statutorily created rights and remedies that are legal and enforceable in ordinary courts of law);
see also Feldman, supra note 50, at 269 (explaining that irrespective of congressional intent,
Seventh Amendment requires jury trial for legal actions).
142. See Niemeier, supra note 50, at 140 (stating that Congress cannot take away right to
jury trial for legal rights by statutory enactment).
143. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text (discussing Krofft court's reasoning
for denying right to jury trial); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977) (analyzing issue and failing to discuss its legal or
equitable nature); Patry, supra note 4, at 188 (criticizing Kroffl and implying that court failed
to address Seventh Amendment claim).
144. 715 F.2d 211 (2dCir. 1983).
145. Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983) (declaring that statute assigns
determination of all statutory damages, including increased penalties for willful infringement,
to judge and not to jury). In Oboler, the Second Circuit addressed an appeal from a district
court's directed verdict on liability and the award of damages. Id. at 212. After affirming the
directed verdict as to liability, the court vacated the directed verdict on damages because it
determined that this decision should not have been taken from the jury. Id. In remanding the
damages issue, the court explained that the plaintiffs could either elect statutory damages or
have a new trial on the issue of actual damages. Id. at 212-13. The Oboler court summarily
stated that § 504(c) assigned the determination of statutory damages to the judge and not to the
jury. Id. at 213. Thus, the Second Circuit determined that if the plaintiffs elected statutory
damages, anew trial would not be necessary because the statutory construction does not provide
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The Oboler rationale is weak because (1) the finding that the judge
decides statutory damages is conclusory and without reasoning or precedential
support 149 and because (2) the court found the statute definitive and failed to
perform a constitutional analysis. 5 ' First, the Second Circuit simply declared,
without even pointing to the exact language that supports its finding, that the
statute authorized the judge to determine statutory damages.' Instead, the
court merely cited Sections 504(c)(1) and (2).152 Apparently, the court believed
that the statutory language was clear on this point.' Because Section 504(c)(1)
does not explicitly state that the judge decides statutory damages, the Second
Circuit's lack of explanation is remarkable. 54 Furthermore, the court failed
even to mention an earlier Second Circuit case, Mail & Express Co. v. Life Pub-
lishing Co., "' which heldthatthejury determined the statutory damages issue. '56
149. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1952 n.23 (criticizing Oboler court for failing to
analyze question adequately and for providing no explanation or support for its finding).
150. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635,639 (8th Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing Oboler decision and noting court's failure to perform constitutional analysis); see also
2 GOLDSTEN, supra note 135, § 14.6 (noting that early cases are not dispositive because they
failed to consider constitutional question of whether statutory damages are legal or equitable).
151. See Obolerv. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211,213 (2d Cir. 1983) (deciding statute provides for
judge to determine statutory damages but failing to cite any specific language that supports con-
clusion).
152. See id. (citing entire Section 504 as support for decision that Section 504 assigns
determination to judge without explaining citation). Because the statute does not explicitly state
that the judge decides the statutory damages issue, the court's failure to explain its statutory
language analysis makes it difficult to understand the basis for its conclusion. See supra note
46 (quoting Section 504(c)). Furthermore, although the court also cited Nimmer On Copyright
for additional support that this decision was "the better view," this citation still does not explain
how the statutory language places the decision in the hands of thejudge instead of thejury. See
id.; see also 4 NIMMER &NIMMER, supra note 50, § 14.04[C] (recognizing that "court" does not
necessarily mean judge without jury, but stating that it is "perhaps the better view" without
providing textual support for conclusion). Therefore, not only does the court fail to provide the
analysis to explain its decision, the sources it cites also add little to our understanding of the
statutory construction of Section 504(c).
153. See Oboler, 714 F.2d at 213 (providing no discussion of alternative interpretations
of statutory language); see also Cass County Music, 88 F.3d at 639 (determining that Oboler
court apparently found statutory construction determinative of issue).
154. See supra note 46 (quoting Section 504(c)).
155. 192 F. 899 (2d Cir. 1912).
156. Mail & Express Co. v. Life Publ'g Co., 192 F. 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1912) (finding that
1909 Act permits jury assessment of statutory damages is "better view"). In Mail & Express,
the Second Circuit considered whether, under the 1909 Act, the judge had the authority to direct
the jury to award at least $250 (the statutory minimum) in damages. Id. at 900. In analyzing
the statute, the Mail & Express court determined that the language was "somewhat obscure."
Id. at 901. However, in focusing on the word "court" in the provision, the Mail & Express court
found that this language did not require the judge without the jury to assess statutory damages.
Id. Instead, the court determined that the statute permittedjury assessment of such damages and
stated that this was the "better view." Id.
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In Mail & Express, the Second Circuit determined that, although the statutory
language was somewhat unclear, the statute's reference to the "court" did not
require the judge to assess the statutory damages.157 Although the Mail &
Express court made its finding based on the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act incorpo-
rated the statutory language referring to the word "court."'58 Therefore, based
on the Second Circuit's earlier interpretation, the language of Section 504(c)
is, at the least, ambiguous. In light of this earlier ruling, the Oboler court's
failure to cite the exact language in the statute that it relied upon and its failure
to discuss and to distinguish Mail & Express demonstrates the weakness of the
opinion. Finally, although the Oboler court cited a Fourth Circuit case that had
reached the opposite decision, it failed to provide a detailed analysis of the
issue to explain why its decision, and not the Fourth Circuit's, was correct.'59
Thus, the Oboler court's cursory treatment of the issue renders its statutory
language analysis unpersuasive.
Second, the Oboler court failed to address the question of whether a
Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial exists for a statutory damages claim in
copyright infringement actions independent of any statutorily created right.6 '
Instead, the court based its decision that no right exists entirely on the statutory
language.' Therefore, like the Krofft decision, Oboler is not definitive law
because the Second Circuit did not perform a separate constitutional analysis
of the issue. 62
The three other circuits that have found no right to ajury trial have based
their decisions on both the statutory language and the Seventh Amendment. 63
157. See id. (assertingbeliefthat"court" doesnotnecessarilymeanjudgeactingbyhimself).
158. Compare supra note 45 (quoting Section 25(b) of 1909 Act which states that damages
shall be determined "as to the court shall appear to be just") with supra note 46 (quoting Sec-
tion 504(c) of 1976 Act which provides that damages shall be awarded within statutory limits
"as the court considers just").
159. See infra notes 213-28 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit case dealing
with statutory damages under Section 504(c) and right to jury trial).
160. See Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 212-13 (2d Cir. 1983) (determining that no right
to jury trial exists for statutory damages issue but failing even to mention Seventh Amendment);
see also Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635,639 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing
Oboler decision and noting failure to perform constitutional analysis).
161. See Oboler, 714 F.2d at 213 (deciding that statute assigns determination of statutory
damages to judge and not to jury); see also Cass County Music, 88 F.3d at 639 (concluding that
Oboler court found statute definitive on issue of right to jury).
162. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress cannot take
away constitutional right to jury trial by statutory enactment and arguing that Krofft analysis is
faulty and incomplete because court ruled that no right to jury trial exists based only on statute's
language only).
163. See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 852
(11 th Cir. 1990) (following Fifth Circuit by finding no constitutional or statutory right to jury
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In Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co.,'" the First Circuit found that neither
the 1909 Act nor the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right to a jury trial
on the statutory damages issue.6 The court first stated that it believed the
statute clearly did not provide for ajury trial for statutory damages. 66 Second,
the court recognized that the statute alone could not deny ajury trial when the
Seventh Amendment guarantees one. 67 However, in Palermo the court deter-
mined that no distinction existed between actual and statutory damages because
both were "incidental" to the equitable relief requested, and as a result, the
entire case was equitable and triable by a judge.6 Furthermore, the court
found that a subsequent Supreme Court decision implied that only judicial
discretion could achieve the flexibility necessary to award statutory damages. 1
69
trial); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6,7 (5th Cir. May 1981) (stating that
entire case is equitable under Ross and therefore no constitutional or statutory right to jury trial
exists); Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1957) (finding that
because statutory damages provision invoked equity jurisdiction no constitutional or statutory
right to jury trial exists).
164. 249 F.2d 77 (lst Cir. 1957).
165. Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 80-81 (lst Cir. 1957) (finding that
statute does not provide for right and determining that no constitutional right exists because
Section 101(b) creates equitable claim). In Palermo, the court considered whether the defen-
dant had the right to request a jury trial in a copyright infringement case when the plaintiff
sought both an injunction and the statutory damages minimum. Id. at 79-80. First, the court
quoted Section 101(b) and concluded, without explanation, thatbased on the statute, thedefen-
dant had no right to ajury trial. Id at 80. However, the court recognized that this reasoning
was incomplete because it still must consider whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the
right to ajury trial when the plaintiffrequests statutory damages. Id. Turning to the constitu-
tional issue, the Palermo court explained that the right to ajury trial exists only for actions at
law and not for suits in equity. Id. Furthermore, the court recognized that, if damages are
"incidental" to the equitable relief requested, the judge may decide the entire complaint using
his equity jurisdiction. Id at 81. In this case, the court explained that the statutory damages
were "incidental" to the prayer for injunction and as a result the judge could determine both
issues. Id. at 81-82. Specifically, the court reasoned that a claim for damages that are by nature
a penalty is not incidental to an equitable claim. Id. at 82. However, because Section 101(b)
specifically states that statutory damages are not punitive, the court determined that they were
incidental to the injunction request. l Consequently, the court found that the complaint
invoked equity jurisdiction and thus no constitutional right to ajury trial exists. Id. at 81.
166. See id. at 80 (declaring that if statute was only source at issue, defendant would have
no right to jury trial).
167. See id. (explaining that FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) protects Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial and also requires constitutional test on issue).
168. See id. at 81-82 (finding that statutory damages are not punitive and therefore are
incidental to injunction request so that entire case could be heard by court sitting in equity with-
out jury); see also Niemeier, supra note 50, at 147 n.81 (discussing "incidental" rationale).
169. See id. at 82 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228,
232 (1952) in which Supreme Court discussed need forjudicial discretion in determining issues
under Section 101(b)).
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Thus, the court concluded that no right to a jury trial existed for statutory
damages in copyright cases.'
Both the incidental relief and the flexibility rationale of Palermo are
unpersuasive in answering the question of whether a right to ajury trial exists.
First, although the court's characterization of statutory damages as incidental
was sufficient to find that no constitutional right existed when it decided
Palermo, a subsequent Supreme Court ruling found that courts cannot impinge
upon the right to a jury trial for legal issues by characterizing the issue as
"incidental" to an equitable claim. 71 As a result of this ruling, another court
argued that the Palermo decision now actually supports the position that all
copyright damages, including statutory, are legal and require a jury trial. 7
Second, the Palermo court misread the Supreme Court decision on which it
relied to find that awarding statutory damages required judicial and not jury
discretion.'73 The Supreme Court decision did not address the issue of the right
tojury trial, but instead considered the judge's authority to hear evidence by the
defendant regarding profits when the plaintiff sought only statutory damages.' 74
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's discussion of flexibility and discretion
related to the court's right under Section 101(b) to choose between statutory
and actual damages in a given case.'75 The 1976 Act, however, expressly gives
this election to the copyright owner instead of the court. Thus, one cannot apply
the Palermo court's reasoning to the 1976 Act. 76 Therefore, subsequent court
decisions and statutory revisions preclude the Palermo decision from being
dispositive on the issue of a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial.
In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith,177 the Fifth Circuit determined
that no constitutional or statutory right to ajury trial exists for damages sought
170. See id. at 81-82 (finding that claims fall within court's equity jurisdiction).
171. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962) (finding that court cannot
deny Seventh Amendment right to jury trial for legal claims by finding that they are "incidental"
to equitable claims joined in same complaint); see also 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 135, § 14.6
(arguing that cases relying on "incidental" rationale are no longer dispositive as result of Dairy
Queen decision); Patry, supra note 4, at 183-84 (discussing Dairy Queen decision).
172. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635,639 (8th Cir. 1996) (point-
ing out that Palermo court refused to recognize distinction between actual and statutory dam-
ages and arguing that because actual damages are legal, statutory damages must be legal also).
173. See Patry, supra note 4 , at 181 (challenging Palermo court's reading of Woolworth).
174. See id. (claiming that part of Woolworth on which Palermo court relied dealt with
presentation of evidence of profits and not right to jury trial).
175. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1952)
(finding that statute empowers court to use discretion to determine if proven profits and dam-
ages or estimated damages within statutory limits are more just in given case).
176. See supra note 46 (quoting Section 504(c) of 1976 Act); supra note 138 and accom-
panying text (demonstrating that 1976 Act affects authoritative value of Woolworth findings).
177. 645 F.2d 6(5th Cir. May 1981).
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under Section 504(c) of the 1976 Act. 78 In this very brief opinion, the court
did not find the right to ajury trial question difficult to address.'79 Referring
entirely to case citations for support of its conclusion, the court simply declared
that the entire case was equitable, and thus, the defendants did not have a right
to ajury trial.18°
The Twentieth Century opinion contains flaws both because the court fails
to provide any analysis' and because the cases the court cites for support have
weaknesses and application problems.8 2 The Twentieth Century court disposed
of the question of the right to ajury trial in a single paragraph."8 This para-
graph merely asserts that the answer to the question is simple and contains only
the conclusion that the court reaches.' The court provided no analysis of
either the statutory construction or the constitutional issue in its strictly conclu-
sory decision.'85 Instead, it simply cited cases to support the conclusion that no
right to ajury trial exists.8 6 If one assumes that the Fifth Circuit adopted the
analyses presented in these cases as its own, the Twentieth Century decision
178. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6,7 (5th Cir. May 1981) (per curi-
am) (concluding that entire case is equitable and thus defendant had no statutory or constitu-
tional right to jury trial). In Twentieth Century, the court considered whether a defendant could
request ajury trial in a copyright infringement case when the plaintiff sought an injunction and
minimum statutory damages. d at 7. The court stated that the question was a simple one. Id.
Specifically, providing merely case citations for support, the court simply declared that the
whole case was equitable without explaining its analysis of the issue. Id. Consequently, the
court found that no constitutional right to ajury trial exists for a statutory damages claim. Id.
179. See id. ("This appeal seems to present very simple questions.").
180. See id (providing no analysis of issues but citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531
(1970); Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co.,249 F.2d 77 (lst Cir. 1957); and Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Papa John's Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 302 (N.D. Ind. 1979) to support its conclusion).
181. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1996)
(arguing that Fifth Circuit reached conclusion without real analysis); Breuninger, supra note
57, at 254-55 (noting that Twentieth Century court simply cited cases decided under 1909 Act
and found them to be adequate precedent); Patry, supra note 4, at 191 (criticizing Twentieth
Century for its sparse decision); Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1952 n.23 (noting that Twentieth
Century confined analysis to list of case citations).
182. See Twentieth Century, 645 F.2d at 7 (citing Palermo, 249 F.2d at 78); supra notes
166-76 and accompanying text (discussing problems with Palermo opinion).
183. See Twentieth Century, 645 F.2d at 7 (addressing issue and stating conclusion in one
short paragraph).
184. See id at 7 (asserting simplicity of question presented and declaring conclusion that
no constitutional or statutory right to jury trial exists).
185. See id (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), but failing to apply any
constitutional analysis); see also Cass County Music, 88 F.3d at 640 (arguing that Fifth Circuit
reached conclusion without real analysis)
186. See Twentieth Century, 645 F.2d at 7 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970);
Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 78 (1st Cir. 1957); and Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 302 (N.D. Ind. 1979) to support conclusion).
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also incorporates the weaknesses of these other cases. In other words, in citing
Palermo as authority, the Twentieth Century decision faces the same criticisms
as the First Circuit's opinion.'17 Additionally, the Twentieth Century court
relied on a district court decision. This district court opinion provided limited
support because it involved the 1909 Act, notthe 1976 Actwhich governed the
Twentieth Century case.8 8 The district court opinion relied on the finding that
Section 101(b) created an equitable remedy because the statute gave the court
discretion to decide whether to award actual or statutory damages, which the
court saw as a codification of traditional equitable powers.8 9 However, as
discussed previously, the 1976 Act gives the plaintiff, not the court, the power
to elect statutory damages. 9' Therefore, the district court's analysis does not
apply to the 1976 Act, and the Fifth Circuit should have independently ana-
lyzed the relevant issues instead of simply citing other courts' opinions.
In Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Products, Inc.,'91 the
Eleventh Circuit held that defendants are entitled to neither ajury nor a bench
trial on the statutory damages issue, provided that the court permits the parties
to submit supporting evidence. 9 - In reaching this holding, the court followed
the former Fifth Circuit's decision in Twentieth Century which found no
statutory or constitutional right to ajury trial.'93 Although it was reasonable for
the Eleventh Circuit to follow the former Fifth Circuit,9 in so doing, the criti-
187. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (discussing weaknesses of Palermo).
188. See Twentieth Century, 645 F.2d at 6 (citing 1976 Act); Papa John's, 201 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 303, 306 (deciding no right to jury trial for statutory damages case brought pursuant
to 1909 Act).
189. See Papa John's, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 305-06 (finding that nature of remedy was
equitable because § 101(b) gives court authority to award either actual or statutory damages at
its discretion).
190. See supra notes 138,176 and accompanying text (comparing differences in 1909 and
1976 Act as to who elects statutory damages); see also notes 45-46 (providing text of 1909 and
1976 Acts).
191. 902 F.2d 829(llth Cir. 1990).
192. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 852-53
(1lth Cir. 1990) (holding that defendants are not entitled to eitherjury orbench trial in copyright
infringement case seeking statutory damages provided that parties submit evidence to court). In
Cable/Home, the court considered whether the defendants were entitled to ajury trial on the
issue of statutory damages. Id. at 852. The court quickly dispensed with this question by relying
on Twentieth Century's holding that there is neither a statutory nor constitutional right to ajury
trial on this matter (which the former Fifth Circuit decided before it split into the present Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits). Id at 852-53. Consequently, the Cable/Home court held that, if the
parties were entitled to submit all their supporting evidence to the court, neither the statute nor
the Seventh Amendment allows the defendants either a bench or jury trial. Id. at 853.
193. See id. at 852 (following Twentieth Century decision).
194. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1996)
(noting that Eleventh Circuit would follow former Fifth Circuit).
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cisms of Twentieth Century necessarily apply to Cable/Home.9
The Ninth Circuit addressed the right to ajury trial under the 1976 Act'9
in ColumbiaPictures Television v. KryptonBroadcastingofBirmingham, Inc. '97
The court performed a constitutional analysis and found no Seventh Amend-
ment right to ajury trial because the award of statutory damages is equitable in
nature. 9 In Columbia Pictures, the court found the 1976 Act sufficiently
analogous to the 1909 Act to rely on the Krofft decision to determine that the
statute did not provide for the right to a jury trial.'99 However, unlike Kroffl,
the Columbia Pictures court also considered whether the Seventh Amendment
required a jury trial on the statutory damages issue.200 The court's constitu-
tional analysis of this question relied exclusively on citations of decisions of
other courts which concluded that no statutory or constitutional right exists
because statutory damages are equitable.20' However, the Columbia Pictures
decision adds little to the debate concerning whether the nature of the remedy
is equitable or legal; the court's analysis of this question consists merely of its
conclusion.2 2 The court simply cites cases both for and against its decision that
195. See supra notes 181-90 (discussing weaknesses of Twentieth Century).
196. The Ninth Circuit had previously determined that no right to a jury trial existed for
copyright infringement actions involving statutory damages under the 1909 Act. See supra
notes 130-43 and accompanying text (discussing Kroffi in whichNinth Circuitrested its decision
that no right to jury trial existed solely on statutory construction of 1909 Act).
197. 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997).
198. Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. ofBirmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284,
293 (9th Cir.) (finding no Seventh Amendment right to jury trial because statutory damages are
equitable), cert. granted sub nom. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 118 S. Ct. 30
(1997). In Columbia Pictures, the court considered whether either the statute or the Seventh
Amendment provided for a jury trial on the statutory damages issue. Id. at 292-93. First, in
deciding the statutory question, the Columbia Pictures court relied on the circuit's past findings
inKrofft. Id. Specifically, the Columbia Pictures court found that although the Kroffl decision
was made under the 1909 Act, its analysis applied to the 1976 Act because the relevant language
was the same. Id. at 293. The court determined that, although the 1976 Act assigned the elec-
tion of statutory damages to the plaintiff, the Krofft court's rationale on the statutory construc-
tion still applied. Id. The Columbia Pictures court reasoned that had Congress wished to over-
rule the Krofft court's decision, it would have changed the statutory language in the 1976 Act.
Id. Second, in addressing the constitutional question, the court determined that the statutory
damages remedy was equitable. Id. However, the court did not explain this finding, but merely
cited other court cases both for and against its position. Id. Consequently, the Columbia
Pictures court found that the Seventh Amendment was not applicable to copyright statutory
damages issues. Id
199. Id. at 292-93.
200. Id. at 293.
201. Id. (stating that court agrees with cases finding no constitutional right to jury trial
because remedy is equitable and citing cases both for and against position).
202. See id. (failing to provide explanation for conclusion that statutory damages are equi-
table remedy); see also supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text (discussing debate over
nature of statutory damages remedy).
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statutory damages are equitable, without explaining the merits of its position
or the problems with the opposition's view.2"3 Therefore, like the Twentieth
Century decision, the constitutional analysis provided by the Columbia Pictures
court is conclusory.2 4
In conclusion, five circuits have decided that neither a statutory nor consti-
tutional right to a jury trial exists in a copyright infringement suit when the
plaintiffelects statutory damages.2 5 Yet, as the above discussion demonstrates,
five major criticisms undermine the persuasiveness and validity of those courts
of appeals' decisions. First, two courts decided their cases under the 1909 Act,
rendering the application of these analyses to the 1976 Act questionable
because, although the 1909 Act gave the court discretion to decide whether to
award actual or statutory damages, the 1976 Act assigns the election of statu-
tory damages to the copyright owner."° Second, two courts failed to conduct
a constitutional analysis and instead denied the right to ajury trial solely on the
basis ofthe statutory language.20 7 As argued above, Congress cannot take away
the constitutional right to a jury trial through statutory enactment, and thus, if
a court finds that the statute does not provide for the right, it still must decide
whether the Seventh Amendment applies.20 8 Third, several circuit court
decisions were conclusory. By failing to provide their own analyses and merely
citing other courts of appeals and district court cases as authority, these courts
relied on the other cases' analyses and opinions and, consequently, also adopted
those cases' flaws.20 9 Fourth, the Supreme Court has since overruled one
203. See Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 293 (citing cases finding statutory damages are
equitable but also citing cases finding statutory damages are legal without any explanation as
to why Columbia Pictures court agreed with former decisions).
204. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (arguing that Twentieth Century decision
is conclusory because court merely cited authority and failed to perform its own analysis of
issues).
205. See supra notes 128-204 and accompanying text (discussing and criticizing cases
finding no right to jury trial).
206. See supra notes 134, 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing Kroffi decision's
finding of equity jurisdiction through discretion given to court by 1909 Act to decide whether
to award statutory damages and questioning application to 1976 Act, which assigns election of
statutory damages to owner); supra notes 165, 175-76 and accompanying text (arguing that
Palermo decision is not authoritative because it is based on 1909 Act).
207. See supra note 129 (listing cases basing decision on statutory language only); supra
note 131 (summarizing Krofft court's analysis); supra note 145 (providing summary of Oboler
court decision).
208. See supra notes 135, 140-43 and accompanying text (arguing that Krofft opinion is
not authoritative because it fails to consider constitutional right to jury trial); supra notes 150,
160-62 and accompanying text (criticizing Oboler court's failure to provide constitutional anal-
ysis of question).
209. See supra notes 149, 151-59 and accompanying text (arguing that Oboler decision is
conclusory and incomplete because it failed to perform its own analysis even in light of prior
1716
THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIALS
court's rationale for analyzing whether there was a constitutional right to ajury
trial.21 Fifth, one court misinterpreted the decision it cited as authority for its
position.2" Although these cases represent the majority view, the foregoing
discussion demonstrates the weaknesses of these precedents.
B. The Minority View
Prior to the Cass County Music decision, only two circuit courts of appeals
had found that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial for copyright
infringement statutory damages issues.2" In Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc.,213
the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court to reach such a conclusion.1 4
Second Circuit decision finding right to jury trial); supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text
(arguing that Twentieth Century decision is conclusory and demonstrating difficulties that arise
when decision is based solely on case citations as authority); supra notes 200-04 and accom-
panying text (criticizing Columbia Pictures court's reliance on other cases and arguing that
decision does not help reach definitive answer on question because court does not provide
analysis).
210. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (explaining that Supreme Court's
Dairy Queen decision overruled Palermo's "incidental" analysis).
211. See supra notes 173 -74 and accompanying text (arguing that Palermo misread Wool-
worth decision and used Woolworth incorrectly to support conclusion that no right to jury trial
exists).
212. See Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1015-16, 1017 (7th Cir.
1991) (performing Seventh Amendment analysis and holding that judge should submit to jury
factual questions of infringement and willfulness, but should reserve for himself decision of
appropriate award of statutory damages); Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 121
(4th Cir. 1981) (holding that Seventh Amendment mandates trial by jury in copyright infringe-
ment action for statutory damages).
213. 653 F.2d 117(4th Cir. 1981)
214. Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding
constitutional right to trial by jury in copyright infringement action for statutory damages). In
Gnossos, the Fourth Circuit considered whether either the statute or the Seventh Amendment
provided for a jury trial when the copyright owner seeks only an injunction and minimum
statutory damages. Id. at 118. First, the court stated that it must consider the statutory con-
struction because the court must decide the matter on these grounds instead of constitutional
grounds whenever possible. Id. at 118-19. The Gnossos court determined that the statutory
language is ambiguous and thus neither provided for nor denied the right to ajury trial. Id. at
119. However, the court suggested that the language favored granting the right over denying
it. Id. Specifically, the court noted that, like the Copyright Act, the Truth in Lending Statute
and the fair housing statute both refer to the "court" and in both cases courts have held that
Congress meant to require ajury trial. Id. Second, the Gnossos court addressed the constitu-
tional issue. Id. The court provided a two-part test, developed by the circuit in a prior case, that
consisted of: (1) considering whether the statutory rights and duties are analogous to rights and
duties historically recognized at common law and (2) determining whether the remedies are
legal rather than equitable in nature. Id. at 120. The court compared the statutorily created right
to the common law tort actions, specifically, tortious interference with a property right. Id.
Furthermore, the court found that minimum statutory damages are analogous to the ancient civil
action for debt. Id. Finally, the court determined that the statutory damages award limitations
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The Gnossos court first determined that the statutory construction of the 1976
Act did not provide clearly for the right to a jury trial. However, it found that
the language enforced rather than detracted from the interpretation that the
statute granted this right.1 ' Second, the court found that the Seventh Amend-
ment applies to statutory damages by analogizing the statutory rights and rem-
edies to legal rights and remedies recognized by the common law.216 Thus, the
court found a constitutional right to a jury trial both for the issues of infringe-
ment and for the determination of the amount of the statutory damages award.
217
Three criticisms of the Gnossos decision are (1) that the constitutional
analysis was weak because the analogies drawn are arguable,218 (2) that the
court misread and misapplied cases it used as support,21 9 and (3) that the
constitutional test utilized was conclusory and inconsistent with the Ross test."
First, although the Gnossos court may be correct to claim that the Copyright
Act creates rights similar to tort actions, this argument is unhelpful in deter-
mining whether statutory damages are legal because tort actions can be equita-
ble or legal depending on the relief sought.22' The court's analogy to an action
for debt is equally troubling because the Supreme Court has explained that such
an action requires that the sum sought can be reduced to a certainty. 2 How-
did not affect the analysis because statutory limits set by Congress in other contexts have not
affected the right to a jury trial. Id. Consequently, the court determined that the Seventh
Amendment applied to copyright statutory damages. Id. at 121.
215. See id. at 119 (suggesting that language could be read to imply right to jury trial).
216. See id. at 120 (applying Fourth Circuit test developed in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc.,
577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978), comparing recovery for breach of rights and duties created by
CopyrightActto common law tort actions, and analogizing statutory damages remedy to ancient
civil action for debt).
217. See id. at 120-21 (finding that Seventh Amendment applies to statutory damages
under Copyright Act and determining that fact-finder (jury) decides not only issues of infringe-
ment but also sets amount of damage award within statutory limits).
218. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1960 (criticizing Gnossos court's analogies to common
law rights and remedies); see also Feldman, supra note 50, at 276 n.97, 278 (same).
219. See Breuninger, supra note 57, at 256 (arguing that Gnossos court misapplied Curtis
and Barber principles); see also Niemeier, supra note 50, at 145 (comparing Curtis findings of
Title VII and VIII to Sections 504(c) and (b) respectively).
220. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1957 n.59 (criticizing Gnossos formulation of Curtis
test as "unique," conclusory, and inconsistent with Ross test).
221. See id. at 1960 (arguing that copyright is good example of tort action that is both legal
(when owner seeks actual damages) and equitable (when plaintiff requests injunction only));
see also Feldman, supra note 50, at 276 n.97 (pointing out that cases cited to support tort anal-
ogy for copyright infringement used analogy not in Seventh Amendment context but to deter-
mine ifjoint and several liability applied). But see Phippen, supra note 5, at 805-06 (arguing
correctuess of analogy because both copyright infringement actions and tortious interference
with property actions are actions to protect right of ownership).
222. See Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. 531, 542 (1871) (describing action for debt
as being "sum certain").
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ever, statutory damages are not certain when the plaintiff seeks more than the
minimum award, making the actual amount granted discretionary within the
statutory limits.' Second, the Gnossos court misinterpreted cases it used as
authority because, although the cases found certain statutory damages legal,
these statutory provisions are not analogous to copyright law.' The statutory
damages involved in the other cases were actual and punitive, but § 504(c)
damages are neither actual nor punitive and thus do not fall in the same
category.' Third, the constitutional test applied by the Fourth Circuit is con-
clusory and unhelpful in characterizing the case as a whole.' Specifically, the
court labeled the rights and remedies as "legal" through analogy, without
substantively answering the question of how to determine the legal nature of the
analogous right and remedy.' Instead, unlike the Gnossos court's test, the
Ross Court's historical analysis test provides a substantive answerto this inquiry
and should have been applied." Thus, because of these criticisms, the Gnossos
decision is not dispositive with respect to the issue of the right to a jury trial.
In Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd.," 9 the Seventh Circuit determined
that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury-trial on the issues
of infringement and willfulness when the plaintiff seeks statutory damages."
223. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1960 (arguing that court, using its discretion, deter-
mines statutory damages award within limits set in statute and thus statutory damages are unlike
action for debt which Supreme Court has defined as "sum certain"); see also Feldman, supra
note 50, at 278 (characterizing analogy as unpersuasive when plaintiffseeks more than statutory
minimum because sum is no longer certain). Butsee Phippen, supra note 5, at 806 (arguing that
analogy to action for debt is proper because Copyright Act creates debt to compensate wrongful
use of work).
224. See Breuninger, supra note 57, at 256 (criticizing Gnossos analogy to Curtis and
Barber because those cases dealt with actual and punitive damages).
225. See id. (arguing that analogy does not apply because copyright statutory damages are
neither actual nor punitive); see also Niemeier, supra note 50, at 145 (comparing Curtis
decision that remedies provided under Title VIII of Civil Rights Act are legal to § 504(b) and
decision that Title VII remedies are equitable to § 504(c)). But see Phippen, supra note 5, at
805 (arguing that analogy to Curtis and Barber was correct).
226. See Stumpff, supra note 12, at 1957 n.59 (arguing that Gnossos court's formulation
of test merely splits elements of cause of action into rights and remedies without attempting to
determine nature of underlying case as whole).
227. See id. (arguing that labels placed on elements does little to advance constitutional
inquiry).
228. See id. (arguing that Gnossos formulation of test is inconsistent with Ross and does
not answer substantive question). But see Feldman, supra note 50, at 275 (arguing that
Gnossos test is functional equivalent of first two prongs of Ross).
229. 925 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1991).
230. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 1991) (con-
cluding thatjury decides issues of infringement and willfulness in every copyright infringement
action in which plaintiff seeks monetary damages of any sort). In Video Views, the Seventh
Circuit addressed the question of the right to ajury trial in copyright infringement suits brought
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However, the Video Views court stated that the judge and not the jury deter-
mines the appropriate award of damages, within statutory limits." In deciding
the constitutional issue, the court applied the Ross test. 2 First, the court con-
cluded that the factual issues were not beyond the practical abilities ofjuries. 3
Second, by drawing an analogy to tort and trademark actions, the court found
that the copyright statute created a legal cause of action. Tm Third, the court
studied the remedy and found that any discretion given to determine the amount
of the award is simply congressionally provided flexibility and is not intended
to deny the right to a jury trial."ss Thus, the Video Views court found that the
Seventh Amendment applies to the factual issues involved in a copyright statu-
tory damages suit.26
Although the Video Views decision appeared to go through all of the steps
for a thorough analysis of this issue, some of its statements and findings were
conclusory and lack support, thereby undermining the authority of the opinion.
First, the Video Views court stated that the statutory language did not resolve
under § 504(c). Id. at 1014. First, the court simply stated that the statutory language does not
resolve this question. Id. Second, the court announced that "[i]t is ... clear" that the judge
determines the appropriate amount of the award, within the statutory limits. Id. Third, the court
applied the Ross test to analyze the constitutional question. 1d. at 1015. Finding that the issues
involved were not beyond the practical abilities ofjuries, the court determined that the first two
prongs of the Ross test were the important parts of the analysis. Id. Specifically, the court
compared the nature of the right created by the copyright statute to the legal actions of tort and
trademark infringement, which it viewed as an action at law to vindicate the tortious interference
with an intellectual property right. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the right created was
legal. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the remedy defied blanket characterization as legal
or equitable, but presented an analysis to support its finding that copyright infringement
involves legal remedies. Id. 1015-16. Specifically, the court explained that the plaintiff can
elect statutory damages for any reason and does not have to meet the equity standard that no
adequate remedy at law exists. Id Moreover, the court reasoned that the discretion given to
the district court in determining the amount of the award is not the level of discretion the
Supreme Courthastermed "equitable." Id. at 1016. Instead, the court explained, this discretion
is merely flexibility within statutory limits and thus is not a reason for denying the right to ajury
trial on the substantive issues of the case. Id. Consequently, the Video Views court found a
constitutional right to jury determination of the issues of infringement and willfulness even
when the plaintiff seeks statutory damages only. Id.
231. See id, at 1014 (declaringthatjudge sets award amountwithoutproviding explanation
for statement).
232. See id. at 1015 (quoting Ross footnote containing three-part analysis).
233. See id. (deciding factual issues of infringement are not too complicated for jury and
relying on first two prongs of Ross test to settle question).
234. See id. (determining that nature of rights created by statute are legal).
235. See id. at 1016 (deciding that Congress did not intend level of discretion given in
§ 504(c) to divest parties of right to jury trial but merely granted judge flexibility in setting exact
award of damages).
236. See id. (concluding that jury decides issues of infringement and willfulness in every
copyright suit in which plaintiff seeks monetary award).
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the question, without explaining its reasons for reaching such a conclusion."3
Although the conclusion may be correct, the court's failure to support its
finding is a mistake because of the Supreme Court's determination that the
courts should analyze statutory construction for a resolution of the issue before
considering the constitutional issue" 8 and because of the fact that other circuits
have based their decisions solely on the statutory language. 9 Second, the
Video Views court declared that the right to a jury trial does not extend to the
determination of the amount of statutory damages without citing any support
for this decision.24 The court's failure to address this issue completely is odd
considering that it decided that the Seventh Amendment guarantees ajury trial
for the substantive issues involved in a statutory damages claim.24 Further-
more, the court cited the Gnossos decision as contrary authority, without distin-
guishing or criticizing its conclusion that the jury should decide the damage
award.242 Moreover, the Video Views court used part of the Gnossos court's
analysis to support its finding that the jury determines the factual issues
involved in the case without explaining the basis for its agreement with this part
of the Gnossos decision, but disagreed with the finding that the jury also
237. See id at 1014 (dismissing statutory construction analysis with statement that it
simply does not answer question).
238. See supra note 11 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, in which Supreme Court explained that
statutory language analysis may allow court to resolve question without addressing constitu-
tional issue).
239. See supra note 129 (citing cases using statutory language to answer question).
240. See Video Views, 925 F.2d at 1014 (stating its conclusion is "clear" without providing
any supporting authority).
241. See id. at 1016 (reaching this conclusion); see also Niemeier, supra note 50, at 151
(explaining that Supreme Court has noted that any curtailment of right to jury trial "should be
scrutinized with utmost care" (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501
(1959))). One can certainly argue that the Video Views court did not meet this standard because
it failed to provide any meaningful consideration of this issue. See supra note 237 and accom-
panying text (arguing that court's statement that judge decides amount of damages was conclu-
sory).
One commentator has argued that Tull supports the bifurcation of infringement and dam-
ages issues. See Niemeier, supra note 50, at 152 (arguing that Tull reasoning applies to copy-
right statutory damages). However, the Tull decision rested on a finding that the legislative
history demonstrated that Congress intended judges to perform "the highly discretionary calcu-
lations necessary to award civil penalties." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425 (1987).
Neither the Video Views court nor the commentator made any such findings regarding the
Copyright Act's legislative history. Furthermore, the Video Views court's finding that the dis-
cretion granted in § 504(c) is merely a grant of flexibility belies an argument that these statutory
damages involve "highly discretionary calculations." See Video Views, 925 F.2d at 1016
(finding that discretion in § 504(c) is not of level to characterize remedy as equitable). There-
fore, neither the court nor this commentator offers valid support for this bifurcation.
242. See Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1014 (7thCir. 1991) (noting
Gnossos decision is contrary authority).
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determines the amount of the statutory damages award. 43 Third, in addressing
the second prong of the Ross test, the Video Views court drew an analogy to
trademark infringement without adequately explaining the similarities of the
two causes of action.2" Additionally, like the Gnossos court, the Video Views
court analogized the copyright cause of action to atort action and thus inherited
the same criticisms concerning this analogy as discussed above. 45 Thus, like
all the other circuit court decisions, Video Views is flawed.
In conclusion, prior to Cass County Music, two circuit courts of appeals
decided that a constitutional right to a jury trial exists in a copyright infringe-
ment suit when the plaintiff elects statutory damages. 46 However, these
decisions suffer from two of the same shortcomings as the majority view
decisions. First, one court misread the authority it used to support its find-
ings.247 Second, both decisions included conclusory statements that provide
little assistance in resolving the dispute between the circuits.248 Thus, before
Cass County Music, no court had provided a thorough analysis that definitively
answered the question of whether a right to ajury trial in a copyright infringe-
ment suit exists when the plaintiff seeks statutory damages.
V The Cass County Music Decision
In Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R, Inc.,249 the Eighth Circuit finally
addressed the question of whether either the statute provides or the Seventh
Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in a copyright infringement suit
when the plaintiffelects statutory damages."° In addressing this issue, the Cass
County Music court briefly discussed and criticized the prior circuit court
decisions." Recognizing that none of the prevailing opinions adequately
243. See id. at 1015 (relying on Gnossos analogy between copyright and tort).
244. See id. (noting only that trademark and copyright infringement actions both may be
viewed as actions for tortious interference with intellectual property right).
245. See supra notes 218,221-23 and accompanying text (arguing that Gnossos opinion's
analysis of nature of action is weak).
246. See Video Views, 925 F.2d at 1016 (concluding that jury decides issues of infringe-
ment and willfulness in every copyright infringement action in which plaintiff seeks monetary
damages of any sort); Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that jury decides both substantive issues and amount of statutory damages award).
247. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (arguing that Gnossos court misinter-
preted cases cited as authority).
248. See supra notes 218, 221-22, 226-28 and accompanying text (arguing that Gnossos
court based decision on conclusory statements); supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text
(arguing that Video Views court based decision on conclusory statements).
249. 88 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 1996).
250. See supra note 20 (discussing Cass County Music).
251. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 639-40 (8th Cir. 1996)
(summarizing other circuit court decisions).
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answered the question, the court concluded that it must analyze the issues
itself. 2 The Cass County Music court first studied the statutory language of
§ 504(c). 3 The court considered the statute's use of the words "court" and
"discretion," but noted that the Supreme Court has found that statutory lan-
guage providing for the court to use its discretion does not automatically imply
judicial decision-making. 4 The court also found that although the statute
provides for monetary relief, the Supreme Court has never stated that all
monetary relief is legal in nature." As a result, the Cass County Music court
concluded that the statute does not dispositively answer the question. 2"
Next, the Cass County Music court performed aconstitutional analysis and
focused on the first two prongs of the Ross test.57 In characterizing the nature
of the action, the court turned to a recent Supreme Court patent decision to aid
in the historical analysis." The Supreme Court recently found that the modem
patent infringement actions derive from eighteenth century legal actions and
that "there is no dispute" that the jury must decide the factual issues of patent
infringement. 9 The Cass County Music court then drew an analogy between
copyright and patent infringement actions and, based on the recent patent
decision, found that copyright infringement actions are legal.260 The court's
252. See id. at 640 (finding that it must consider question itself because of differing opin-
ions by circuits); see also supra notes 205-11, 246-48 and accompanying text (summarizing
criticisms of other circuit court decisions).
253. See id at 640-41 (explaining that, in right to jury trial context, court must first deter-
mine if Congress provided for right to jury trial in statute before considering constitutional
issue); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that first step in analysis is
to consider statutory language).
254. See Cass County Music, 88 F.3 d at 641 (reasoning that references to court's discretion
do not automatically vest decision in judge's hand and citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974) for support); see also supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text (discussing debate over
use of "court" and "discretion").
255. See Cass County Music, 88 F.3d at 641 (explaining that Supreme Court has not deter-
mined that all monetary damages are necessarily legal in nature).
256. See id. (determining that statute does not answer question); see also supra note 54 and
accompanying text (explaining that commentators have also found statutory language unclear).
257. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635,641 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing
Wooddell v. International Bhd of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991) and
Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) for constitutional test which is
same as Ross premerger custom and nature of remedy analysis); supra notes 61-65 and accom-
panying text (discussing Ross test).
258. See Cass County Music, 88 F.3d at 641 (discussing Supreme Court holding in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 (1996) that modem patent
infringement derive from legal eighteenth century infringement cases and mustbe tried to jury).
259. See id (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389
(1996) (finding that patent infringement actions are legal)).
260. See id. at 641-42 (explaining that copyright and patent infringement actions are
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analogy considered that both actions are derived from the same constitutional
provision,261 that the Supreme Court has treated patent and copyright similarly
when examining the purposes behind the constitutional provision and enacted
laws,262 and that the elements of infringement in both cases are "functionally
the same."263 Thus, the Cass County Music court concluded that copyright
infringement actions are legal actions triable by a jury.2"
In addressing the nature of the remedy, the Cass County Music court
followed the Tull decision.265 The court determined that because the jury's
assessment of money damages is a fundamental component of the common-law
trial by jury, it must allow the jury to set the amount of the damages award
unless these statutory damages have equitable "attributes." '266 The court then
demonstrated that the nature of the statutory damages relief is both restitution-
ary and punitive.267 Thus, it has both equitable and legal attributes. However,
the court explained that the punitive, or legal, nature outweighs the restitution-
ary, or equitable, nature of these statutory damages in many cases.268 The court
also asserted that the monetary award is neither incidental to nor intertwined
with the injunctive relief, and therefore copyright statutory damages do not
analogous).
261. See id. at 641 (noting that Congress derives its power over patent and copyright from
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
262. See id. at 641-42 (demonstrating that Supreme Court treats copyright and patent
similarly when studying purposes of enactments and citing cases to support conclusion).
263. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 642 (8th Cir. 1996)
(noting elements of liability for copyright and patent are same).
264. See id. (finding that copyright actions are legal actions to be tried to jury).
265. See id. (using Tull decision's principles for test to determine if remedy is legal and
should be assessed by jury). The Cass County Music court explains that Tull teaches that a
jury trial is constitutionally required if the jury must award the statutory damages in order
to "preserve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by jury."' Id (quoting Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987)). The court then stated that statutory damages are
money damages and that the jury assessment of money damages is fundamental to common-
law trial by jury. See id. (making findings about nature of statutory damages). Finally, the
court explained that it would create an exception to this rule only if the damages have equi-
table attributes. See id. (quoting Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570
(1990)).
266. See id. (explaining reasoning and case law authority for analysis).
267. See id. at 642-43 (explaining that damages are restitutionary in that they are awarded
"in lieu" of actual damages and also may be invoked when legal remedy is inadequate but also
demonstrating that damages are punitive, especially in situations where damage suffered and
profits earned is much lower than statutory minimum). But see supra note 116 (discussing
problems with assumption that statutory damages restitutionary character demonstrates that it
is equitable remedy because restitution can be either legal or equitable).
268. See id. at 643 (noting that statutory damages do not merely put plaintiff in position
he should have been in but also, and perhaps preeminently, punish wrongdoer).
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have a second equitable attribute.269  The court concluded that statutory
damages are a legal remedy because they do not display equitable attributes.270
As a result of this analysis, the court found that the Seventh Amendment
guarantees the right to ajury trial on both the factual issues of infringement and
the assessment of statutory damages.27
Additionally, the Cass County Music court briefly considered whether
Congress intended to forego fact-finding for the assessment of damages when
it set statutory limits on the awards.272 The court rejected this consideration
because it demonstrated that, even if neither actual damage nor profit is the
basis of statutory damages, the parties will wish to present evidence to influ-
ence the decision-maker's assessment of the damages within these limits.273
Furthermore, the court explained that the Supreme Court has stressed the
importance of the maintenance of the jury as fact-finder and has cautioned that
courts should scrutinize closely any curtailment of the role of the jury.274 Thus,
the court reasoned that the jury properly assesses the award of statutory
damages.2 75
269. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (pro-
viding practical explanation that amount of statutory minimum cannot be seen as "incidental"
and that injunction and statutory damages are not intertwined because each can be awarded
without considering other).
270. See id. (weighing legal and equitable attributes and determining that statutory dam-
ages for copyright infringement are legal remedy).
271. See id. at 644 (holding that either party has constitutional right to jury trial on factual
issues and damages assessment). However, it is important to note that the Cass County Music
court did not analyze the third prong of Ross but merely stated in a footnote its conclusion that
the issues involved are not too complicated for juries. See id. at 643 n.6 (noting that court is
satisfied that no problems withjury ability exist). Although one might believe that this footnote
undermines the effectiveness of the Cass County Music opinion, in fact, the court may have
been correct in summarily dismissing this problem. Because the court had found that the issue
and remedy were legal, the third prong could not affect the analysis either way as the Supreme
Court has stated that the third prong cannot be used as an independent basis for denying the
right to ajury trial. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing Ross and progeny's
third prong). Therefore, even without an explanation to support this conclusion, the constitu-
tional analysis is complete.
272. See Cass County Music, 88 F.3d at 643-44 (finding fact that statutory damages are
awarded within set range neither means that no fact-finding is necessary nor makes fact-finding
so difficult as to require judge to assess award).
273. See id. (reasoning that when plaintiff seeks damages greater than statutory minimum,
both parties will present evidence to help fact-finder narrow range of damage award).
274. See id. at 644 (noting that jury is fact-finding body and any change in this function
"should be scrutinized with the utmost care") (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500, 501 (1959)); see also supra note 241 and accompanying text (arguing that Video
Views failed to meet Beacon standard).
275. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R, Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 644 (8th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that fact-finder limitations argument is not persuasive).
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Based on the above summary, it is clear that Cass County Music provides
the best reasoned, most thorough handling of the issue. First, the Eighth
Circuit conducted its own analysis of the issue, did not rely on any of the prior
circuit decisions, and therefore did not adopt the problems with other circuits'
reasoning and conclusions. 76 Moreover, Cass County Music presented a com-
plete analysis of the issue and provided an explanation of its reasoning, in
addition to stating its conclusions.277 The court recognized that in answering
the question it must begin with an analysis of the statutory construction.27
Instead of merely asserting its conclusion that the language is not dispositive,279
the court presented the major arguments for both the equitable and legal nature
of the statute and demonstrated that the Supreme Court has not found these
arguments dispositive in other areas.80 Thus, the Cass County Music court
provided support for its conclusion that the statutory language does not answer
the question.8 Second, the court's constitutional analysis was thorough and
compelling. In addressing the nature of the action, the court avoided the
problems that other courts faced in drawing weak analogies to actions such as
tort.82 The Supreme Court's patent decision allowed the Cass County Music
court to draw a very persuasive analogy. The analogy is strong because
Congress draws its power over both patent and copyright from the same
constitutional provision- aprovision enacted prior to the Seventh Amendment.
Also, the Supreme Court's decision leaves no question about the historically
legal nature of the patent action and, by analogy, of the copyright infringement
action.83 Moreover, in analyzing the nature of the remedy, the Eighth Circuit
276. See supra notes 205-11, 246-48 and accompanying text (summarizing problems of
other circuit courts' decisions).
277. See supra notes 207-09, 218,226-28 and accompanying text (criticizing both majority
and minority view court decisions for failure to completely analyze issue and for reliance on
conclusory statements instead of explaining reasoning).
278. See supra note 253-56 and accompanyingtext(demonstrating that Cass County Music
decision properly recognized importance of statutory construction analysis).
279. See supra notes 166, 183-86, 237 and accompanying text (arguing that Palermo,
Twentieth Century, and Video Views courts concluded that statutory language was not disposi-
tive on issue without providing any explanation).
280. See Cass CountyMusic, 88 F.3d at641 (analyzingstatutory language andthenfinding
it is not conclusive).
281. As a result, the Cass County Music court avoids the criticism of other circuit courts'
decisions that the opinions do not aid in determining the answer to this question because they
fail to provide any support for the conclusory statements that are at the heart of their opinions.
See supra notes 209,218,221-22,226-28 and accompanying text (criticizing conclusory nature
of past circuit court opinions).
282. See supra notes 221, 245 and accompanying text (criticizing Gnossos and Video
Views use of analogy to tort actions).
283. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (discussing problems involved in
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was the only court that applied the teachings of the Tull case to weigh the legal
and equitable attributes to support its conclusion that the jury must assess the
statutory damage award aswell as decide the factual issues.2 To demonstrate
its finding that statutory damages are more punitive than restitutionary, the
court showed that in many statutory damages cases, including Cass County
Music, the damage award represents more punishment than actual loss.
285
Furthermore, the court gave a practical explanation for why these statutory
damages are not incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief.286 Thus, the
Cass County Music court provided a thorough constitutional analysis, sup-
ported by both case law and practical examples.
Furthermore, the Cass County Music decision surpasses the decisions of
other circuits because it presented both new arguments and additional support
for its conclusions. For example, Cass County Music was able to use both the
Supreme Court's patent opinion and the Tullteachings to avoid problems other
courts have faced in their constitutional analyses.287 The court also supported
its findings with other case authority and examples, thereby avoiding criticism
thatthe analysis was conclusory.288 Therefore, the Cass County Music decision
is the most well-reasoned and comprehensive disposition of this question
because it provided a complete statutory and constitutional analysis of the issue,
incorporating Supreme Court tests, supporting authority, practical consider-
ations, and examples, while avoiding the problems created by the other circuits'
opinions. Thus, the Eighth Circuit dispositively found a constitutional right
to a jury trial for both factual issues and damage assessment in copyright
infringement actions when the plaintiffelects statutory damages. The Supreme
drawing analogy between tort and copyright, including question of whether tort actions can all
be characterized as legal).
284. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 642 (8th Cir. 1996)
(finding thatjury performs damages assessment). Butsee Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd.,
925 F.2d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that jury does not assess damage award);
Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 121(4th Cir. 1981) (concluding thatjury decides
both factual and assessment issues).
285. See Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that in instant case statutory damages will be predominantly punitive because plain-
tiff suffered little actual loss and defendant reaped few profits). To be sure, the nature of statu-
tory damages, unlike actual damages, guarantee that the award amount will not be entirely com-
patible to any reimbursement for damages and profits.
286. See id. at 643 (explaining that statutory damages are neither incidental to nor inter-
twined with injunctive relief because statutory award is not nominal and plaintiff can bring
action for damages without seeking injunction).
287. See supra 210-11, 224 and accompanying text (discussing misinterpretation and
analogy problems that Cass County Music avoided).
288. See supra notes 209,218,221-22,226-28 and accompanying text (criticizing conclu-
sory nature of past circuit court opinions).
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Court should follow the Cass County Music opinion when it ultimately decides
this issue m the spring of 1998.9
V. Conclusion
At present, the United States Courts of Appeals are splif over the right to
ajury trial m a copyright infringement action when the plaintiff seeks statutory
damages. 9 Even within the majority and minority divisions, the courts cannot
agree on the analysis and reasoning used to reach their conclusions.29' The lack
of consensus among the circuits demonstrates the difficulties and complexities
involved in the statutory and constitutional analysis of the issue.292 However,
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this issue and will finally resolve
the circuit split.
Cass County Music provides a useful resolution to this controversy The
Eighth Circuit has examined fully this complex legal issue and has provided
a complete statutory and constitutional analysis.9 Moreover, the Cass County
Music decision succeeded in avoiding the problems the other circuits faced
in their analyses of this issue.294 Finally, the Cass County Music court reached
the correct decision in a complicated area of the law. Therefore, the Supreme
Court should take note of the Cass County Music opinion as well as the
following sentiment expressed by one district court judge: "If I have erred,
and I do not believe that I have, then I have erred on the side of protecting
an important constitutional right, fundamental to the fair administration of
justice.
295
289. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaiung that Supreme Court will decide
issue of right to jury trial in copyright infringement action when plaintiff elects statutory
damages in case of Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television).
290. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing circuit court decisions).
291. See supra Parts IV & V (analyzing circuit split).
292. See supra notes 205-11, 246-48 and accompanying text (summarizing criticisms of
circuit court opinions).
293. See supra Part V (reviewing Cass County Music decision).
294. See supra notes 205-11, 246-48,276-86 and accompanying text (summarizing criti-
cisms of circuit court opinions and determining that Cass County Music does not have same
problems).
295. Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 670 F Supp. 1237, 1243 (D.N.J. 1987).
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